In the terminology of classical signaling models we capture the impression that high types may send lower signals than low types in order not to appear too desperate. Overeagerness of low types or conversely modesty of high types can be described by our model. In contrast to the...

We study a decision maker (DM) who has preferences over sets of payoff-allocations between herself and a passive recipient, which represent second-stage choice problems. The recipient is only aware of second-stage choice of an allocation. Not choosing the normatively best allocation in the...

Following Kreps (1979), I consider a decision maker who is uncertain about her future taste. This uncertainty leaves the decision maker with a preference for flexibility. When choosing among menus containing alternatives for future choice, she weakly prefers menus with additional alternatives....

Following Kreps (1979), we consider a decision maker who is uncertain about her future taste for immediate consumption. This uncertainty leaves the decision maker with a preference for flexibility: When choosing among menus containing alternatives for future choice, she weakly prefers menus with...

We establish that in the Prisoners’ Dilemma, the model of Daley and Sadowski (2013) is logically distinct from three models that employ well-known forms of other regarding preferences - altruism (Ledyard, 1995; Levine, 1998), inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), and reciprocity (Rabin,...

We study an individual who faces a dynamic decision problem in which the process of information arrival is unobserved by the analyst, and hence should be identified from observed choice data. An information structure is objectively describable if signals correspond to events of the objective...

We study an individual who faces a dynamic decision problem in which the process of information arrival is unobserved by the analyst. We derive two utility representations of preferences over menus of acts that capture the individuals uncertainty about his future beliefs. The most general...

We consider a decision maker who experiences transient preference shocks when faced with dynamic decision situations that involve intertemporal tradeoffs, such as those in consumption savings problems. We axiomatize a recursive representation of choice over infinite horizon consumption problems...

We provide axiomatic foundations for a simple model of play in the prisoners’ dilemma. The model accommodates cooperation and suggests that players behave as if their expectations about their opponents’ behavior vary with their own choice. We refer to this nonstandard updating as magical...