In an experimental study we examine a variant of the <i>'minimum effort game'</i>, a coordination game with Pareto ranked equilibria, and risk considerations pointing to the least efficient equilibrium. We focus on the question whether simple cues such as smiles, winks and handshakes could be...

In an experimental study we examine a variant of the 'minimum effort game', a coordination game with Pareto ranked equilibria and risk considerations pointing to the least efficient equilibrium. We focus on the question whether simple cues such as smiles, winks and handshakes could be recognised...

In an experimental study we examine a variant of the ‘minimum effort game’, acoordination game with Pareto ranked equilibria, and risk considerations pointing to theleast efficient equilibrium. We focus on the question whether simple cues such as smiles,winks and handshakes could be...

In an experimental study we examine a variant of the 'minimum effort game', a coordination game with Pareto ranked equilibria, and risk considerations pointing to the least efficient equilibrium. We focus on the question whether simple cues such as smiles, winks and handshakes could be...