We consider abstract exchange mechanisms wherein individuals submit "diversified" offers in m commodities, which are then redistributed to them. Our first result is that if the mechanism satisfies certain natural conditions embodying "fairness" and "convenience" then it admits unique prices, in...

We consider mechanisms that provide traders the opportunity to exchange commodity i for commodity j, for certain ordered pairs ij. Given any connected graph G of opportunities, we show that there is a unique mechanism M_G that satisfies some natural conditions of "fairness" and "convenience."...

Existence of equilibrium is proved for an exchange strategic market game with complete markets. An example of equilibrium with inconsistent prices is given.

This paper introduces a highly simplified version of "sudden-death" scoring. The basic game is as follows. With equal probability the teams toss to see who gets the ball. The team with the ball can either run or try to kick a field goal. The first team to score wins the game.

There are two sources of inefficiency of strategic equilibria (SE) in market mechanisms. The first is the oligopolistic effect, which occurs when an agent can single-handedly influence prices. With a continuum of agents we get "perfect competition" and this effect is, of course, wiped out. But...