This paper examines an Outside Option Game Designed to study the tension between maximizing the size of the surplus and bargaining over the division of thus surplus among those who contributed to its creation.

This paper studies a population of agents, each of whom can be either an Altruist or an Egoist. Altruists confer benefits on others at a cost to themselves. Altruism is thus a strictly dominated strategy and cannot survive if agents are rational best-responders. We assume that agents choose...

We show that a strategy profile of a normal form game is proper if and only if it is quasi-perfect in every extensive form (with that normal form). Thus, properness requires optimality along a sequence of supporting trembles, while sequentiality only requires optimality in the limit.

In his work on signaling, Spence proposed a dynamic model of a market in which a buyer revises prices in light of experience and in which sellers, with private information about their type, choose utility-maximizing signals given these prices. We follows Spence's suggestion of introducing...

A strategy profile of a normal form game is proper if and only if it is quas-perfect in every extensive form (with that normal form). Thus, properness requires optimality along a sequency of supporting trembles, while sequentiality only requires optimality in the limit.