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The Implementation Duality
Nöldeke, Georg; Samuelson, Larry - 2015
We use the theory of abstract convexity to study adverse-selection principal-agent problems and two-sided matching problems, departing from much of the literature by not requiring quasilinear utility. We formulate and characterize a basic underlying implementation duality. We show how this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011390710
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The implementation duality
Nöldeke, Georg; Samuelson, Larry - 2015
We use the theory of abstract convexity to study adverse-selection principal-agent problems and two-sided matching problems, departing from much of the literature by not requiring quasilinear utility. We formulate and characterize a basic underlying implementation duality. We show how this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010499578
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The Implementation Duality
Nöldeke, Georg - 2017
Conjugate duality relationships are pervasive in matching and implementation problems and provide much of the structure essential for characterizing stable matches and implementable allocations in models with quasilinear (or transferable) utility. In the absence of quasilinearity, a more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012944599
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The Implementation Duality
Nöldeke, Georg - 2015
We use the theory of abstract convexity to study adverse-selection principal-agent problems and two-sided matching problems, departing from much of the literature by not requiring quasilinear utility. We formulate and characterize a basic underlying implementation duality. We show how this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013026253
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The Implementation Duality
Nöldeke, Georg - 2018
Conjugate duality relationships are pervasive in matching and implementation problems and provide much of the structure essential for characterizing stable matches and implementable allocations in models with quasilinear (or transferable) utility. In the absence of quasilinearity, a more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012922807
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The Implementation Duality
Noldeke, Georg; Samuelson, Larry - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2015
We use the theory of abstract convexity to study adverse-selection principal-agent problems and two-sided matching problems, departing from much of the literature by not requiring quasilinear utility. We formulate and characterize a basic underlying implementation duality. We show how this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011201348
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The Implementation Duality
Nöldeke, Georg; Samuelson, Larry - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Zentrum, Universität Basel - 2015
We use the theory of abstract convexity to study adverse-selection principal-agent problems and two-sided matching problems, departing from much of the literature by not requiring quasilinear utility. We formulate and characterize a basic underlying implementation duality. We show how this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011204529
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Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships, Second Version
Cripps, Martin; Mailath, George J.; Samuelson, Larry - 2004
For games of public reputation with uncertainty over types and imperfect public monitoring, Cripps, Mailath, and … Samuelson (2004) showed that an informed player facing short-lived uninformed opponents cannot maintain a permanent reputation …'s reputation is private. We also show that the rate at which reputations disappear is uniform across equilibria and that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014070419
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Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships
Cripps, Martin; Mailath, George J.; Samuelson, Larry - 2004
For games of public reputation with uncertainty over types and imperfect public monitoring, Cripps, Mailath, and … Samuelson (2004) showed that an informed player facing short-lived uninformed opponents cannot maintain a permanent reputation …'s reputation is private …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014073174
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Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations, Second Version
Cripps, Martin; Mailath, George J.; Samuelson, Larry - 2003
maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about … types. Thus, a player cannot indefinitely sustain a reputation for non-credible behavior in the presence of imperfect …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014078915