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This paper presents simple su±cient conditions under which optimal bunches in adverse-selection principal-agent problems can be characterized without using optimal control theory.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011390605
Human utility embodies a number of seemingly irrational aspects. The leading example in this paper is that utilities often depend on the presence of salient unchosen alternatives. Our focus is to understand <i>why</i> an evolutionary process might optimally lead to such seemingly dysfunctional features...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599367
We examine an Outside Option Game in which player I submits a claim for a share of a cake while player II simultaneously either makes a claim or chooses to opt out. If player II opts out, then she receives an opt-out payment while player I receives nothing. If player II opts in and if the claims...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291005
This paper develops an approach to equilibrium selection in game theory based on studying the equilibriating process through which equilibrium is achieved. The differential equations derived from models of interactive learning typically have stationary states that are not isolated. Instead, Nash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291051
In his work on market signaling, Spence proposed a dynamic model of a signaling market in which a buyer revises prices in light of experience and sellers choose utility-maximizing signals given these prices. Spence also suggested that subjecting the dynamic process to rare perturbations might...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291072
This paper presents simple su±cient conditions under which optimal bunches inadverse-selection principal-agent problems can be characterized without using optimal controltheory.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867929
We examine an Outside Option Game in which player I submits a claim for a share of a cake while player II simultaneously either makes a claim or chooses to opt out. If player II opts out, then she receives an opt-out payment while player I receives nothing. If player II opts in and if the claims...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009693904
In his work on market signaling, Spence proposed a dynamic model of a signaling market in which a buyer revises prices in light of experience and sellers choose utility-maximizing signals given these prices. Spence also suggested that subjecting the dynamic process to rare perturbations might...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009697462
This paper develops an approach to equilibrium selection in game theory based on studying the equilibriating process through which equilibrium is achieved. The differential equations derived from models of interactive learning typically have stationary states that are not isolated. Instead, Nash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009697463
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013077899