point of deviation from the equilibrium, must be within of a best E response. This concept implies, but is stronger than …, Radner's ex ante perfect E-equilibrium. A strategy profile is a contemporaneous perfect E-equilibrium of a game if it is a … subgame perfect equilibrium in a perturbed game with nearly the same payoffs, with the converse holding for pure equilibria …

of deviation from the equilibrium, must be within of a best response. This concept implies, but is not implied by Radner …'s ex ante perfect equilibrium. A strategy profile is a contemporaneous perfect equilibrium of a game if it is a subgame … perfect equilibrium in a game achieved by perturbing payoffs by at most e/2, with the converse holding for pure equilibria …

, infinite- horizon bargaining game. The MESS concept modifies the idea of an neutrally stable strategy by favoring a simple … practice of counting states in automata. If strategy A is a MESS, then the use of A by both play- ers is a Nash equilibrium in … shares received by the two players in the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of Rubinstein's game. As the probability of a …

-offers, infinite-horizon bargaining game. The mess concept modifies the idea of a neutrally stable strategy by favoring a simple … the surplus is then bounded between the shares received by the two players in the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of … bounds collapse on the subgame-perfect equilibrium. These results continue to hold when offers must be made in multiples of a …

-out payments. -- bargaining ; coase conjecture ; evolutionary games ; drift …