We use the theory of abstract convexity to study adverse-selection principal-agent problems and two-sided matching … for stable outcomes featuring positive assortative matching in a matching model. …

make investments before matching in a competitive market. We introduce the notion of premune-ation values—the values to the …

make investments before matching in a competitive market. We introduce the notion of premuneration values—the values to the …

surplus in the absence of interagent transfers. Most of the work in the large bargaining-and matching literature ignores this …

make investments before matching in a competitive market. We introduce the notion of premuneration values—the values to the …

We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual …

make investments before matching in a competitive market. We introduce the notion of premuneration values -- the values to …

A large literature uses matching models to analyze markets with two-sided heterogeneity, studying problems such as the … matching of students to schools, residents to hospitals, husbands to wives, and workers to firms. The analysis typically … matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual problem is to formulate a notion of a blocking pair …

make investments before matching in a competitive market. We introduce the notion of premuneration values---the values to …