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We propose an elementary theory of wars fought by fully rational contenders that features three of the main rationalist explanations for armed conflicts: uncertainty, commitment, and indivisibility. Two parties play a Markov game that combines stages of bargaining, where offers are made, with...
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Contests are situations in which a set of agents compete for a valuable object, rent or award. The present paper analyzes difference-form group contests, that is, contests fought among groups and where their probability of victory depends on the difference of their effective efforts. First, we...
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exists a non-monotonic relationship between the level of underlying rivalry and the level of social conflict. …
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This paper explores the role of conflict as a bargaining tool. It first presents a simple bargaining model with one …-sided incomplete information. Parties can choose the scope of the confrontation they may want to engage in: A limited conflict that … only introduces delay, or an absolute conflict that terminates the game. The outcomes of both types of confrontation are …
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This paper studies bargaining and conflict under incomplete information, provides an overview and a critical account of … sequential bargaining that take confrontation as final. Conflict and inefficiencies are to be expected in these models whenever … parties have optimistic prospects on the outcome of the all-out conflict. After examining the causes and reasons for this …
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