The success of deposit insurance arrangements at eliminating bank runs is likely closely tied to their credibility. We investigate this hypothesis building on two episodes which tested the insurance protection offered by the Portuguese arrangement in the midst of the country's sovereign debt...

We argue that the defining feature of large and complex banks that makes their failures messy is their reliance on runnable financial liabilities that confer liquidity or money-like services that may be impaired or destroyed in bankruptcy. To make large bank failures more orderly, we advocate...

We consider a model in which banks vulnerable to liquidity crises may receive support from the lender of last resort (LLR). Higher liquidity standards, though costly to banks, give the LLR more time to find out the systemic implications of denying support to the banks in trouble. By modifying...

The notion that some banks are “too big to fail” builds on the premise that governments will offer support to avoid the adverse consequences of their disorderly failures. However, this promise of support comes at a cost: Large, complex, or interconnected banks might take on more risk if they...

This paper uses an intermediation model to study the efficiency and welfare implications of both banks' required capital-asset ratio and the regulation that limits, and in some countries forbids, banks' investments in equity to a certain proportion of each firm's capital. There are two sources...

This paper uses an intermediation model to study the efficiency and welfare implications of both banks' required capital-asset ratio and the regulation that limits, and in some countries forbids, banks' investments in equity to a certain proportion of each firm's capital. There are two sources...

Firms with debt overhang, measured as total borrowing to cash-flow, experience 2% slower asset growth during ordinary times and up to 3% slower growth during a crisis, compared to similar firms without debt overhang. These patterns extend to a firm's growth in employment and capital...

We provide evidence that credit lines offer liquidity insurance to borrowers. Borrowers are able toextensively use their credit lines in recessions and ahead of credit line cuts. In fact drawdowns andchanges in drawdowns predict internal credit rating downgrades and credit line cuts,...

Professor Viral Acharya of the London Business School and New York University collaborates with New York Fed economists João Santos and Tanju Yorulmazer to analyze various ways to incorporate systemic risk into deposit insurance premiums. Presented at "Central Bank Liquidity Tools and...