We document that the structure of syndicates affects loan renegotiations. Lead banks with large retained shares have positive effects on renegotiations. In contrast, more diverse syndicates deter renegotiations, but only for credit lines. The former result can be explained with coordination...

We investigate the U.S. experience with macroprudential policies by studying the interagency guidance on leveraged lending. We find that the guidance primarily impacted large, closely supervised banks, but only after supervisors issued important clarifications. It also triggered a migration of...

We document that the structure of syndicates affects loan renegotiations. Lead banks with large retained shares have positive effects on renegotiations. In contrast, more diverse syndicates deter renegotiations, but only for credit lines. The former result can be explained with coordination...

We investigate the U.S. experience with macroprudential policies by studying the interagency guidance on leveraged lending. We find that the guidance primarily impacted large, closely supervised banks, but only after supervisors issued important clarifications. It also triggered a migration of...

We provide evidence that credit lines offer liquidity insurance to borrowers. Borrowers are able toextensively use their credit lines in recessions and ahead of credit line cuts. In fact drawdowns andchanges in drawdowns predict internal credit rating downgrades and credit line cuts,...

We study how syndicated lending networks propagate natural disasters. Natural disasters lead to an increase in corporate credit demand in affected regions. Banks meet the increase in credit demand in part by reducing credit to distant regions, unaffected by disasters. Capital constraints play a...

This paper investigates whether the type of institutional affiliation of a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) manager influences the manager's access to information and risk appetite. We base our investigation on CLO managers' trading of distressed loans. Our findings reveal that CLO managers...

We find some support for theories predicting that the presence of informed investors adversely affects liquidity: When arrangers retain a share in the loan this impacts negatively liquidity. We find strong evidence that investor diversity is beneficial to liquidity: Loans with larger syndicates;...

We document that the structure of syndicates affects term loan renegotiations. Lead banks with large retained shares have a positive effect on renegotiations, while the syndicate diversity among nonbank investors is renegotiation friendly. The latter result derives from the growth of...

We investigate whether the securitization of corporate loans affected banks' lending standards. We find that during the boom years of the CLO business, loans sold to CLOs at the time of their origination underperform matched unsecuritized loans originated by the same bank. This finding is robust...