I extend Spence's (1973) signaling model by assuming some workers are overconfident - they underestimate their marginal cost of acquiring education - and some are underconfident. Firms cannot observe workers' productive abilities and beliefs but know the fractions of high-ability, overconfident,...

We study the impact of entrepreneurial optimism on self-nancing and capital market efficiency in a setting where entrepreneurs are better informed about the quality of their projects than investors. Projects have either low- or high-quality. Entrepreneurs use self-finance to signal the perceived...

This paper applies the cognitive hierarchy model of Camerer, Ho and Chong (2004) to the action commitment game of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). The model generates the heterogeneity of behavior reported in Huck, Müeller and Normann (2002). The model predicts the spike in the leadership quantity...

I extend Spence's (1974) labor market signaling model by assuming some workers are overconfident and some underconfident. Overconfident (underconfident) workers underestimate (overestimate) their marginal cost of acquiring education. Firms cannot observe workers' productive abilities and cannot...

Using a laboratory experiment we investigate how skew inuences choices under risk. We find that subjects make significantly riskier choices when the distribution of payoffs is positively skewed, these choices being driven in part by the shape of the utility function but also by subjective...