-dimensional, majority rule election game with two candidates, who might be interested in power as well as in ideology, but not necessarily … differentiation, respectively. Our analysis shows how these equilibrium configurations depend on the relative interests in power (resp …

-dimensional, majority rule election game with two candidates, who might be interested in power as well as in ideology, but not necessarily … differentiation, respectively. Our analysis shows how these equilibrium configurations depend on the relative interests in power (resp …

with two candidates. These candidates are interested in power and ideology, but their weights on these two motives are not … differentiation, respectively. Our analysis shows how these equilibrium configurations depend on the relative interests in power (resp …

classical one-dimensional election game with two candidates. These candidates are interested in power and ideology, but … configurations depend on the relative interests in power (resp., ideology) and the uncertainty about voters' preferences. The …

-dimensional, majority rule election game with two candidates, who might be interested in power as well as in ideology, but not necessarily … differentiation, respectively. Our analysis shows how these equilibrium configurations depend on the relative interests in power (resp …

with two candidates. These candidates are interested in power and ideology, but their weights on these two motives are not … differentiation, respectively. Our analysis shows how these equilibrium configurations depend on the relative interests in power (resp …

We study the effect of power sharing over income redistribution among different socio-economic groups in a model of … rich (resp., the poor) increase (resp., decrease) with power sharing disproportionality. Further, we prove that the Gini … coefficient associated with the distribution of disposable incomes also rises with the disproportionality of the power sharing …