This paper investigates whether monitoring by bank lenders affects CEO incentives of borrowing firms. We find that an … increase in bank monitoring incentives significantly reduce the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock return volatility (Vega …). The results are more profound when bank lenders are more powerful and reputable and have a prior lending relationship with …

cannot be explained by observable manager characteristics explain substantial differences in bank policies and risk … whose economic origins are unobservable. This implies attempts to rein in bank risk-taking by targeting manager …

The issue of bank dividend regulation has become highly controversial as the stress induced on bank capital during the … 2008 financial crisis and the covid pandemic created a demand for enhanced regulation and restrictions on bank dividend … stockholders and depositors, and to preserve the long-term solvency of the bank. Overall our study results show that despite an …

interest rate bids increase monotonically with bank risk and that firms in general prefer higher deposit interest rates … increases above central bank policy rates suggesting that central bank funding crowds out deposits thereby reducing monitoring …

laboratory to examine the benefits and costs of different approaches to the three “legs” of European bank union, i …

laboratory to examine the benefits and costs of different approaches to the three "legs" of European bank union, i …

) focus and diversification using a unique data set that is able to identify individual bank loan exposures to different … deterioration in bank monitoring quality at high levels of risk and a deterioration in bank monitoring quality upon lending … expansion into newer or competitive industries. We find that industrial loan diversification reduces bank return while …