We examine the impact on a firm when it is exogenously forced to switch its bank relationship from one branch to … another branch of the same bank. We show the effect depends directly on the relative balance between the hard accounting … information provided to the bank by the firm, as part of the bank's internal credit rating system and the provision of soft …

We show that concentrating bank regulation on bank capital ratios may be ineffective in controlling risk-taking. We … propose, instead, a more direct mechanism of influencing bank risk-taking incentives, in which the FDIC insurance premium … scheme incorporates incentive features of top-management compensation. With this scheme, we show that bank owners choose an …

intensity of a firm's reliance on bank loan financing. Banks limit dividend payouts to shareholders in order to protect the … dividend payouts. Bank monitoring and corporate governance (insider stake and institutional block holdings) are complementary …

This paper investigates whether monitoring by bank lenders affects CEO incentives of borrowing firms. We find that an … increase in bank monitoring incentives significantly reduce the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock return volatility (Vega …). The results are more profound when bank lenders are more powerful and reputable and have a prior lending relationship with …

cannot be explained by observable manager characteristics explain substantial differences in bank policies and risk … whose economic origins are unobservable. This implies attempts to rein in bank risk-taking by targeting manager …