This paper investigates whether monitoring by bank lenders affects CEO incentives of borrowing firms. We find that an … increase in bank monitoring incentives significantly reduce the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock return volatility (Vega …). The results are more profound when bank lenders are more powerful and reputable and have a prior lending relationship with …

interest rate bids increase monotonically with bank risk and that firms in general prefer higher deposit interest rates … increases above central bank policy rates suggesting that central bank funding crowds out deposits thereby reducing monitoring …

laboratory to examine the benefits and costs of different approaches to the three “legs” of European bank union, i …

laboratory to examine the benefits and costs of different approaches to the three "legs" of European bank union, i …

) focus and diversification using a unique data set that is able to identify individual bank loan exposures to different … deterioration in bank monitoring quality at high levels of risk and a deterioration in bank monitoring quality upon lending … expansion into newer or competitive industries. We find that industrial loan diversification reduces bank return while …

) focus and diversification using a unique data set that is able to identify individual bank loan exposures to different … deterioration in bank monitoring quality at high levels of risk and a deterioration in bank monitoring quality upon lending … bank return while endogenously producing riskier loans for all banks in our sample (this effect being most powerful for …