In multi-party democracies, several parties usually have to join together in coalitionto form government. Many aspects of that process have been fairly fully investigated,others less so. Among the latter is the timing of the formation and announcement ofcoalitions.1While the dominant popular...

We study experimentally how taxpayers choose between two taxregimes to fund a public good. The first-best tax regime imposes ageneral, distortion-free income tax. However, this tax cannot be enforced.The second-best alternative supplements the income tax by a specificcommodity tax. This tax...

We consider a society composed of two regions. Each of them pro-vides a public good whose benefits reach beyond local boundaries.In case of decentralization, taxes collected by members of a regionare spent only on that region's public good. In case of centralization, tax receipts from the two...

We study experimentally how taxpayers choose between two tax regimes to fund a public good. The first-best tax regime imposes a general, distortion-free income tax. However, this tax cannot be enforced. The second-best alternative supplements the income tax by a specific commodity tax. This tax...

We study experimentally how taxpayers choose between two tax regimes to fund a public good. The first-best tax regime imposes a general, distortion-free income tax. However, this tax cannot be enforced. The second-best alternative supplements the income tax by a specific commodity tax. This tax...