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Imitators and Optimizers in Cournot Oligopoly
Schipper, Burkhard - 2005
We analyze a symmetric n-firm Cournot oligopoly with a heterogeneous population of optimizers and imitators. Imitators mimic the output decision of the most successful firms of the previous round à la Vega-Redondo (1997). Optimizers play a myopic best response to the opponents' previous output....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366551
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Imitators and Optimizers in Cournot Oligopoly
Schipper, Burkhard - University of Bonn, Germany - 2002
We present a formal model of symmetric n-firm Cournot oligopoly with a heterogeneous population of profit optimizers and imitators. Imitators mimic the output decision of the most successful firms of the previous round a la Vega-Redondo (1997). Optimizers play myopic best response to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968446
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Strategic teaching and learning in games
Schipper, Burkhard - 2015
It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should … players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic …" or that "could learn itself". Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach such a learning opponent in order …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010516648
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Strategic teaching and learning in games
Schipper, Burkhard - 2017
It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should … players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic … that could "learn itself". Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach such a learning opponent in order to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011764914
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Unawareness, beliefs and games
Heifetz, Aviad (contributor); Meier, Martin (contributor);  … - 2007
We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for many potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003728030
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Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior
Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard - 2009
We define generalized extensive-form games which allow for mutual unawareness of actions. We extend Pearce's (1984) notion of extensive-form (correlated) rationalizability to this setting, explore its properties and prove existence. We define also a new variant of this solution concept, prudent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003878990
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Unawareness, beliefs and speculative trade
Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard - 2009
We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We compare unawareness with probability zero belief. Applying our unawareness belief structures, we show that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003894997
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Speculative trade under unawareness : the infinite case
Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard - 2010 - First draft: March 1, 2007, This draft: February 5, 2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003943569
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Revealed unawareness
Schipper, Burkhard - 2010 - Rev.
I develop awareness-dependent subjective expected utility by taking unawareness structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006, 2008, 2009) as primitives in the Anscombe-Aumann approach to subjective expected utility. I observe that a decision maker is unaware of an event if and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003943576
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Bayesian games with unawareness and unawareness perfection
Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard - 2013
Applying unawareness belief structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2013a), we develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to higher awareness levels and restricted from higher to lower...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010240317