Showing 1 - 10 of 38
It is well known that the rock-paper-scissors game has no pure saddle point. Weshow that this holds more generally: A symmetric two-player zero-sum game hasa pure saddle point if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors game.Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009248997
We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule \imitate-the-best" can hardly be beaten by any other decision rule. Weprovide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable and showthat it can only be beaten by much in games that are of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009248998
We use an experiment to explore how subjects learn to play against computers which are programmed to follow one of a number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463639
We characterize the class of symmetric two-player games in which tit-for-tat cannot be beaten even by very sophisticated opponents in a repeated game. It turns out to be the class of exact potential games. More generally, there is a class of simple imitation rules that includes tit-for-tat but...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993382
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993385
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001529148
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001759614
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008515308
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008215604
We observe that a symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure strategy equilibrium if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors matrix. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric quasiconcave two-player zero-sum game has a pure equilibrium. Further sufficient conditions for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014197729