Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 92
Cover Image
When is Tit-For-Tat unbeatable?
Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Joerg; Schipper, Burkhard - Economics Department, University of California-Davis - 2013
We characterize the class of symmetric two-player games in which tit-for-tat cannot be beaten even by very sophisticated opponents in a repeated game. It turns out to be the class of exact potential games. More generally, there is a class of simple imitation rules that includes tit-for-tat but...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010826387
Cover Image
Once beaten, never again : imitation in two-player potential games
Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Joerg; Schipper, Burkhard - 2012
We show that in symmetric two-player exact potential games, the simple decision rule "imitate-if-better" cannot be beaten by any strategy in a repeated game by more than the maximal payoff difference of the one-period game. Our results apply to many interesting games including examples like 2x2...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009569667
Cover Image
Once beaten, never again : imitation in two-player potential games
Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Joerg; Schipper, Burkhard - 2011
, common pool resource games, and minimum effort coordination games. -- Imitate-the-best ; learning ; exact potential games …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009544209
Cover Image
When is tit-for-tat unbeatable?
Dürsch, Peter; Oechssler, Joerg; Schipper, Burkhard - 2013 - Revised version
resource games, and minimum effort coordination games. -- imitation ; tit-for-tat ; decision rules ; learning ; exact potential …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009743040
Cover Image
Once Beaten, Never Again: Imitation in Two-Player Potential Games
Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Joerg; Schipper, Burkhard - Economics Department, University of California-Davis - 2011
We show that in symmetric two-player exact potential games, the simple decision rule "imitate-if-better" cannot be beaten by any strategy in a repeated game by more than the maximal payoff difference of the one-period game. Our results apply to many interesting games including examples like 2x2...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009393265
Cover Image
Unbeatable Imitation
Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Joerg; Schipper, Burkhard - Economics Department, University of California-Davis - 2012
We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule ``imitate-if-better'' can hardly be beaten by any strategy. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable in the sense that there is no strategy that can exploit imitation as a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010826381
Cover Image
Strategic teaching and learning in games
Schipper, Burkhard - 2015
It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should … players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic …" or that "could learn itself". Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach such a learning opponent in order …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010516648
Cover Image
Strategic teaching and learning in games
Schipper, Burkhard - 2017
It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should … players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic … that could "learn itself". Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach such a learning opponent in order to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011764914
Cover Image
Unbeatable Imitation
Dürsch, Peter; Oechssler, Joerg; Schipper, Burkhard - 2010
We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule "imitate-the-best" can hardly be beaten by any other decision rule. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable and show that it can only be beaten by much in games that are of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003949629
Cover Image
Pure Strategy Equilibria in Symmetric Two-Player Zero-Sum Games
Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Joerg; Schipper, Burkhard - Economics Department, University of California-Davis - 2010
We observe that a symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure strategy equilibrium if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors matrix. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric quasiconcave two-player zero-sum game has a pure equilibrium. Further sufficient conditions for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008738900