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Strategic teaching and learning in games

Schipper, Burkhard - 2015

It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should … players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic …" or that "could learn itself". Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach such a learning opponent in order …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010516648

Strategic teaching and learning in games

Schipper, Burkhard - 2017

It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should … players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic … that could "learn itself". Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach such a learning opponent in order to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011764914

Rage against the machines : how subjects play against learning algorithms

Dürsch, Peter; Kolb, Albert; Oechssler, Joerg; … - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 43 (2010) 3, pp. 407-430

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003960270

Strategic teaching and learning in games

Schipper, Burkhard - In: American economic journal 14 (2022) 3, pp. 321-352

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014228716

Strategic Control of Myopic Best Reply in Repeated Games

Schipper, Burkhard - Economics Department, University of California-Davis - 2011

How can a rational player strategically control a myopic best reply player in a repeated two-player game? We show that in games with strategic substitutes or strategic complements the optimal control strategy is monotone in the initial action of the opponent, in time periods, and in the discount...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008914730

Once Beaten, Never Again: Imitation in Two-Player Potential Games

Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Joerg; Schipper, Burkhard - Economics Department, University of California-Davis - 2011

We show that in symmetric two-player exact potential games, the simple decision rule "imitate-if-better" cannot be beaten by any strategy in a repeated game by more than the maximal payoff difference of the one-period game. Our results apply to many interesting games including examples like 2x2...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009393265

When is tit-for-tat unbeatable?

Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Jörg; Schipper, Burkhard - In: International Journal of Game Theory 43 (2014) 1, pp. 25-36

We characterize the class of symmetric two-player games in which tit-for-tat cannot be beaten even by very sophisticated opponents in a repeated game. It turns out to be the class of exact potential games. More generally, there is a class of simple imitation rules that includes tit-for-tat but...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993382

Unbeatable Imitation

Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Joerg; Schipper, Burkhard - Economics Department, University of California-Davis - 2012

We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule ``imitate-if-better'' can hardly be beaten by any strategy. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable in the sense that there is no strategy that can exploit imitation as a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010826381

When is Tit-For-Tat unbeatable?

Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Joerg; Schipper, Burkhard - Economics Department, University of California-Davis - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010826387

Imitators and Optimizers in Cournot Oligopoly

Schipper, Burkhard - University of Bonn, Germany - 2002

We present a formal model of symmetric n-firm Cournot oligopoly with a heterogeneous population of profit optimizers and imitators. Imitators mimic the output decision of the most successful firms of the previous round a la Vega-Redondo (1997). Optimizers play myopic best response to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968446