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Cournot Competition Between Teams : an Experimental Study

Raab, Philippe; Schipper, Burkhard C. - 2007

In the economic literature on market competition, firms are often modelled as individual decision makers and the internal organization of the firm is neglected (unitary player assumption). However, as the literature on strategic delegation suggests, one can not generally expect that the behavior...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014029080

Unbeatable Imitation

Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Joerg; Schipper, Burkhard C. - Economics Department, University of California-Davis - 2011

We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule "imitate-the-best" can hardly be beaten by any other decision rule. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable in the sense that, even against a very clever opponent,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008620327

Imitators and Optimizers in Cournot oligopoly

Schipper, Burkhard C. - Economics Department, University of California-Davis - 2005

We analyze a symmetric n-firm Cournot oligopoly with a heterogeneous population of optimizers and imitators. Imitators mimic the output decision of the most successful firms of the previous round a la Vega-Redondo (1997). Optimizers play a myopic best response to the opponents' previous output....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008620404

Rage Against the Machines: How Subjects Learn to Play Against Computers

Schipper, Burkhard C.; Oechssler, Jorg; Kolb, Albert - Economics Department, University of California-Davis - 2005

number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious … play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial & error process. We test whether subjects try to influence those … and that all learning algorithms are subject to exploitation with the notable exception of imitation. The experiment was …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008620441

Unbeatable imitation

Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Jörg; Schipper, Burkhard C. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 1, pp. 88-96

We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule “imitate-if-better” can hardly be beaten by any strategy. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable in the sense that there is no strategy that can exploit imitation as a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049802

Rage Against the Machines: How Subjects Learn to Play Against Computers

Dürsch, Peter; Kolb, Albert; Oechssler, Jörg; … - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263153

Rage Against the Machines: How Subjects Learn to Play Against Computers

Dürsch, Peter; Kolb, Albert; Oechssler, Jörg; … - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011422135

Unbeatable Imitation

Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Jörg; Schipper, Burkhard C. - 2010

We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule "imitate-the-best" can hardly be beaten by any other decision rule. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable and show that it can only be beaten by much in games that are of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011422207

Once Beaten, Never Again: Imitation in Two-Player Potential Games

Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Jörg; Schipper, Burkhard C. - 2012

We show that in symmetric two-player exact potential games, the simple decision rule "imitate-if-better" cannot be beaten by any strategy in a repeated game by more than the maximal payoff difference of the one-period game. Our results apply to many interesting games including examples like 2x2...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011422230

Once Beaten, Never Again: Imitation in Two-Player Potential Games

Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Jörg; Schipper, Burkhard C. - Alfred-Weber-Institut für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, … - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011266100