We construct a novel data set to show that, between 2003-2020, up to one-fifth of America’s largest firms had a non-financial blockholder or insider as their largest shareholder. Blockholders and insiders tend to be less diversified than institutional investors. Measures of “universal” and...

The share of stocks beneficially owned by institutional investors has increased substantially over the last three decades. Together with a high and increasing level of concentration in the asset management industry, this trend implies that a small number of institutional investors now constitute...

Competition requires that firms have incentives to compete. Common ownership reduces these incentives. There is no known reason or mechanism by which firms are supposed to compete in the absence of incentives to do so. All arguments in the defense of the asset management industry amount to a...

This internet appendix complements the paper "Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership" and is organized as follows: Section I outlines a model of competition under common ownership that yields the network density measure of common ownership concentration we use in the empirical analysis. The...

Dennis, Gerardi, and Schenone (2017) (DGS) claim to replicate the data construction and results of Azar, Schmalz, and Tecu (forthcoming) (AST). While their implementation of the main specifications in AST generates qualitatively similar results, they claim that AST's baseline results are driven...

We document substantial time-series and cross-sectional variation in branch-level deposit account interest rates, maintenance fees, and fee thresholds, and examine whether variation in bank concentration helps explain variation in these prices. HHI alone is not correlated with any of the outcome...

This note argues that the evidence presented in several critiques of Azar, Schmalz, and Tecu’s “airlines” paper does often not back the conclusion these studies draw. Specifically, widely circulated studies claiming that there are no anticompetitive effects of common ownership, or that...

We show that the main claim in Dennis, Gerardi, and Schenone (JF forthcoming) (DGS), namely "that the documented positive correlation between common ownership and ticket prices stems from the market share component of the common ownership measure, and not the ownership and control components,"...

In this letter we address the terms of reference of the Australian Parliament's Standing Committee on Economics and also make some additional comments. Our key points are as follows: The default model is not that firms will compete. Only if firms have the right incentives they will compete, and...

These slides summarize the theoretical literature on horizontal common ownership concentration and its impact on competition, as presented at the FTC's hearings on common ownership and competition in December 2018. They are primarily based on this literature review:...