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Mit der geplanten Dienstrechtsreform, die von Edelgard Bulmahn, Bundesministerin für Bildung und Forschung, vorgestellt wird, sollen Hochschullehrer in Zukunft leistungsorientiert entlohnt und für junge Nachwuchswissenschaftler bessere Arbeitsbedingungen geschaffen werden. Für Hans Zehetmair,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011691728
Mit der geplanten Dienstrechtsreform, die von Edelgard Bulmahn, Bundesministerin für Bildung und Forschung, vorgestellt wird, sollen Hochschullehrer in Zukunft leistungsorientiert entlohnt und für junge Nachwuchswissenschaftler bessere Arbeitsbedingungen geschaffen werden. Für Hans Zehetmair,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005014018
Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However, there is a tradeoff, first pointed out by Simon (1951), between flexibility and employer moral hazard. An employment contract allows the principal to adjust the task quickly to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010598089
Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However, there is a tradeoff, first pointed out by Simon (1951), between flexibility and employer moral hazard. An employment contract allows the principal to adjust the task quickly to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817249
Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However, there is a tradeoff, first pointed out by Simon (1951), between flexibility and employer moral hazard. An employment contract allows the principal to adjust the task quickly to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084462
Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However, there is a tradeoff, first pointed out by Simon (1951), between flexibility and employer moral hazard. An employment contract allows the principal to adjust the task quickly to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011140971
In Bartling, Fehr and Schmidt (2012) we show theoretically and experimentally that it is optimal to grant discretion to workers if (i) discretion increases productivity, (ii) workers can be screened by past performance, (iii) some workers reciprocate high wages with high effort and (iv)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011140988
In Bartling, Fehr, and Schmidt (2012) we show theoretically and experimentally that it is optimal to grant discretion to workers if (i) discretion increases productivity, (ii) workers can be screened by past performance, (iii) some workers reciprocate high wages with high effort, and (iv)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010828408
Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However, there is a tradeoff, first pointed out by Simon (1951), between flexibility and employer moral hazard. An employment contract allows the principal to adjust the task quickly to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291316
Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However, there is a tradeoff, first pointed out by Simon (1951), between flexibility and employer moral hazard. An employment contract allows the principal to adjust the task quickly to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316905