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Focusing climate negotiations on a uniform common commitment can promote cooperation
Schmidt, Klaus M.; Ockenfels, Axel - 2021 - Final version
International cooperation on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, disarmament, or free trade needs to be … ambitious cooperation. Yet, a proof-of-concept for this important claim is lacking. Based on game theoretical analyses, we … a public good. Subjects differ in their benefits and costs of cooperation. Participation in the negotiations and all …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012500234
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Auctions versus negotiations: The effects of inefficient renegotiation
Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2017
For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation. If the buyer can specify the main characteristics of possible design improvements in a complete contingent contract, a scoring auction implements the efficient allocation. If this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011663451
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Bayesian implementation and rent extraction in a multi-dimensional procurement problem
Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2018
We consider a multi-dimensional procurement problem in which sellers have private information about their costs and about a possible design flaw. The information about the design flaw is necessarily correlated. We solve for the optimal Bayesian procurement mechanism that implements the efficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011985277
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Vertragstheorie: Ökonomie-Nobelpreis 2016 für Oliver Hart und Bengt Holmström
Schmidt, Klaus M. - In: Wirtschaftsdienst 96 (2016) 12, pp. 926-931
In diesem Jahr wurden Oliver Hart und Bengt Holmström für ihre grundlegenden Arbeiten zur Vertragstheorie mit dem Schwedischen Reichsbankpreis für Wirtschaftswissenschaften zu Ehren von Alfred Nobel ausgezeichnet. Dank ihrer Arbeiten ist heute sehr viel besser erforscht, welche...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011956033
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Auctions vs. negotiations: The effects of inefficient renegotiation
Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2014
For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation ex post. We show that this is achieved by bilateral negotiations but not by auctions. Negotiations strictly outperforms auctions if sellers are likely to have superior information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010520618
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Auctions vs. negotiations : the effects of inefficient renegotiation
Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2015
For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation ex post. We show that this is achieved by bilateral negotiations but not by auctions. Negotiations strictly outperforms auctions if sellers are likely to have superior information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010496962
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Auctions vs. Negotiations : The Effects of Inefficient Renegotiation
Herweg, Fabian - 2015
For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation ex post. We show that this is achieved by bilateral negotiations but not by auctions. Negotiations strictly outperforms auctions if sellers are likely to have superior information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013024680
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Vertragstheorie : Ökonomie-Nobelpreis 2016 für Oliver Hart und Bengt Holmström
Schmidt, Klaus M. - In: Wirtschaftsdienst : Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik 96 (2016) 12, pp. 926-931
In diesem Jahr wurden Oliver Hart und Bengt Holmström für ihre grundlegenden Arbeiten zur Vertragstheorie mit dem Schwedischen Reichsbankpreis für Wirtschaftswissenschaften zu Ehren von Alfred Nobel ausgezeichnet. Dank ihrer Arbeiten ist heute sehr viel besser erforscht, welche...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011574308
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The 2016 Nobel Memorial Prize in contract theory
Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2017
Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström were awarded the 2016 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for their fundamental contributions to contract theory. This article offers a short summary and discussion of their path breaking work.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011626725
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Auctions versus negotiations : the effects of inefficient renegotiation
Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2017 - This version: January 29, 2017
For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation. If the buyer can specify the main characteristics of possible design improvements in a complete contingent contract, a scoring auction implements the efficient allocation. If this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011596132