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Focusing climate negotiations on a uniform common commitment can promote cooperation
Schmidt, Klaus M.; Ockenfels, Axel - 2021 - Final version
International cooperation on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, disarmament, or free trade needs to be … ambitious cooperation. Yet, a proof-of-concept for this important claim is lacking. Based on game theoretical analyses, we … a public good. Subjects differ in their benefits and costs of cooperation. Participation in the negotiations and all …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012500234
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Auctions vs. negotiations: The effects of inefficient renegotiation
Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2014
For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation ex post. We show that this is achieved by bilateral negotiations but not by auctions. Negotiations strictly outperforms auctions if sellers are likely to have superior information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010520618
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Vertragstheorie: Ökonomie-Nobelpreis 2016 für Oliver Hart und Bengt Holmström
Schmidt, Klaus M. - In: Wirtschaftsdienst 96 (2016) 12, pp. 926-931
In diesem Jahr wurden Oliver Hart und Bengt Holmström für ihre grundlegenden Arbeiten zur Vertragstheorie mit dem Schwedischen Reichsbankpreis für Wirtschaftswissenschaften zu Ehren von Alfred Nobel ausgezeichnet. Dank ihrer Arbeiten ist heute sehr viel besser erforscht, welche...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011956033
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Bayesian implementation and rent extraction in a multi-dimensional procurement problem
Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2018
We consider a multi-dimensional procurement problem in which sellers have private information about their costs and about a possible design flaw. The information about the design flaw is necessarily correlated. We solve for the optimal Bayesian procurement mechanism that implements the efficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011985277
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Auctions versus negotiations: The effects of inefficient renegotiation
Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2017
For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation. If the buyer can specify the main characteristics of possible design improvements in a complete contingent contract, a scoring auction implements the efficient allocation. If this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011663451
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Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Effects of Inefficient Renegotiation
Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014
For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation ex post. We show that this is achieved by bilateral negotiations but not by auctions. Negotiations strictly outperforms auctions if sellers are likely to have superior information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011096108
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Auctions vs. Negotiations:The Effects of Inefficient Renegotiation
Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014
For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation ex post. We show that this is achieved by bilateral negotiations but not by auctions. Negotiations strictly outperforms auctions if sellers are likely to have superior information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011093297
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Auctions vs. negotiations : the effects of inefficient renegotiation
Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2015
For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation ex post. We show that this is achieved by bilateral negotiations but not by auctions. Negotiations strictly outperforms auctions if sellers are likely to have superior information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010496962
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Auctions vs. negotiations : the effects of inefficient renegotiation
Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2014 - This version: November 25, 2014
For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation ex post. We show that this is achieved by bilateral negotiations but not by auctions. Negotiations strictly outperforms auctions if sellers are likely to have superior information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010439677
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Bayesian implementation and rent extraction in a multi-dimensional procurement problem
Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2018
We consider a multi-dimensional procurement problem in which sellers have private information about their costs and about a possible design flaw. The information about the design flaw is necessarily correlated. We solve for the optimal Bayesian procurement mechanism that implements the efficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011976063