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Adding a stick to the carrot? : the interaction of bonuses and fines

Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2007

actually pay the announced bonus. This offers a new explanation for why explicit and implicit incentives are substitutes rather …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365854

Fairness and Contract Design

Fehr, Ernst; Klein, Alexander; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2005

provide powerful incentives and are superior to explicit incentive contracts when there are some fair-minded players. But …, which offer important new insights into the interaction of contract choices, fairness and incentives. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333864

Adding a Stick to the Carrot? The Interaction of Bonuses and Fines

Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2007

actually pay the announced bonus. This offers a new explanation for why explicit and implicit incentives are substitutes rather …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333948

The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism - Experimental Evidence and New Theories

Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2005

Chapter written for the Handbook of Reciprocity, Gift-Giving and Altruism

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334040

Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity. Evidence and Economic Applications

Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2001

Most economic models are based on the self-interest hypothesis that assumes that all people are exclusively motivated by their material self-interest. In recent years experimental economists have gathered overwhelming evidence that systematically refutes the self-interest hypothesis and suggests...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010427343

Contracts, Fairness, and Incentives

Fehr, Ernst; Klein, Alexander; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2004

actors provide powerful incentives and become superior when there are some fair-minded players. The principals understand … enforcement power of explicit and implicit incentives. This contract preference is associated with the fact that explicit … incentives weaken the enforcement power of implicit bonus incentives significantly. Our results are largely consistent with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010427396

Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model

Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2004

This paper reports on a two-task principal-agent experiment in which only one task is contractible. The principal can either offer a piece-rate contract or a (voluntary) bonus to the agent. Bonus contracts strongly outperform piece rate contracts. Many principals reward high efforts on both...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010427405

The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories

Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2005

This paper surveys recent experimental and field evidence on the impact of concerns for fairness, reciprocity and altruism on economic decision making. It also reviews some new theoretical attempts to model the observed behavior.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010427418

Managerial incentives and product market competition

Schmidt, Klaus M. - 1994

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000886174

Managerial incentives and product market competition

Schmidt, Klaus M. - 1994

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000418220