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Fehr, Ernst; Klein, Alexander; Schmidt, Klaus M. - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 75 (2007) 1, pp. 121-154

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003410472

Fairness, incentives and contractual incompleteness

Fehr, Ernst; Klein, Alexander; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2001

hazard context. Incentive contracts that are optimal when there are only selfish actors become inferior when some agents are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398105

Adding a stick to the carrot? : the interaction of bonuses and fines

Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2007

In this paper we report on a principal-agent experiment where the principal can choose whether to rely on an unenforcable bonus contract or to combine the bonus contract with a fine if the agent's effort falls below a minimum standard. We show that most principals do not use the fine and that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365854

Fairness and contract design

Fehr, Ernst; Klein, Alexander; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2005 - This version: November 5, 2005

provide powerful incentives and are superior to explicit incentive contracts when there are some fair-minded players. But … trust contracts that pay a generous wage upfront are less efficient than incentive contracts. The principals understand this …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371080

Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness

Fehr, Ernst; Klein, Alexander; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2021

hazard context. Incentive contracts that are optimal when there are only selfish actors become inferior when some agents are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013321144

Competition and incentives

Schmidt, Klaus M.; Fey, Lisa Magdalena; Thoma, Carmen - 2017 - This version: April 27, 2017

We report on two experiments that identify non-monetary incentive effects of competition. As the number of competitors …-monetary incentive effects of competition going in the opposite direction. In the experiments we change the number of competitors …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011697511

Competition and incentives

Schmidt, Klaus M.; Fey, Lisa Magdalena; Thoma, Carmen - In: European economic review : EER 98 (2017), pp. 111-125

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011812041

Contracts, fairness, and incentives

Fehr, Ernst; Klein, Alexander; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2004 - This version: March 31, 2004

contracts in a moral hazard context. Explicit incentive contracts that are optimal according to self-interest theory become …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010440446

Fairness and incentives in a multi-task principal-agent model

Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2004 - This version: April 30, 2004

This paper reports on a two-task principal-agent experiment in which only one task is contractible. The principal can either offer a piece-rate contract or a (voluntary) bonus to the agent. Bonus contracts strongly outperform piece rate contracts. Many principals reward high efforts on both...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010440447

Fairness, incentives and contractual incompleteness

Fehr, Ernst; Klein, Alexander; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2001 - This version: February 2001

hazard context. Incentive contracts that are optimal when there are only selfish actors become inferior when some agents are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010440969