effect of contracts on bargaining threatpoints. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to … strategically equivalent bargaining situations in which no ex ante contract was written. The ex ante contract causes sellers to ask … for markups that are 45 percent lower than in strategically equivalent bargaining situations without an initial contract …

effect of contracts on bargaining threatpoints. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to … strategically equivalent bargaining situations in which no ex ante contract was written. The ex ante contract causes sellers to ask … for markups that are 45 percent lower than in strategically equivalent bargaining situations without an initial contract …

effect of contracts on bargaining threatpoints. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to … strategically equivalent bargaining situations in which no ex ante contract was written. The ex ante contract causes sellers to ask … for markups that are 45 percent lower than in strategically equivalent bargaining situations without an initial contract …

effect of contracts on bargaining threatpoints. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to … strategically equivalent bargaining situations in which no ex ante contract was written. The ex ante contract causes sellers to ask … for markups that are 45 percent lower than in strategically equivalent bargaining situations without an initial contract …

effect of contracts on bargaining threatpoints. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to … strategically equivalent bargaining situations in which no ex ante contract was written. The ex ante contract causes sellers to ask … for markups that are 45 percent lower than in strategically equivalent bargaining situations without an initial contract …

There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not in bilateral … bargaining situations. There is also strong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games …

The paper analyzes a finitely repeated bargaining game with asymmetric information. It gives a precise characterization …

effect of contracts on bargaining threatpoints. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to … strategically equivalent bargaining situations in which no ex ante contract was written. The ex ante contract causes sellers to ask … for markups that are 45 percent lower than in strategically equivalent bargaining situations without an initial contract …