Mit der geplanten Dienstrechtsreform, die von Edelgard Bulmahn, Bundesministerin für Bildung und Forschung, vorgestellt wird, sollen Hochschullehrer in Zukunft leistungsorientiert entlohnt und für junge Nachwuchswissenschaftler bessere Arbeitsbedingungen geschaffen werden. Für Hans Zehetmair,...

Mit der geplanten Dienstrechtsreform, die von Edelgard Bulmahn, Bundesministerin für Bildung und Forschung, vorgestellt wird, sollen Hochschullehrer in Zukunft leistungsorientiert entlohnt und für junge Nachwuchswissenschaftler bessere Arbeitsbedingungen geschaffen werden. Für Hans Zehetmair,...

This paper studies the relation between discrete-time and continuous-time principal-agent models. We derive the continuous-time model as a limit of discrete-time models with ever shorter periods and show that optimal incentive schemes in the discrete-time models approximate the optimal incentive...

Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However, there is a tradeoff, first pointed out by Simon (1951), between flexibility and employer moral hazard. An employment contract allows the principal to adjust the task quickly to...

In recent decades, many firms offered more discretion to their employees, often increasing the productivity of effort but also leaving more opportunities for shirking. These "high-performance work systems" are difficult to understand in terms of standard moral hazard models. We show...

Several recent papers argue that contracts provide reference points that affect ex post behavior. We test this hypothesis in a canonical buyer-seller relationship with renegotiation. Our paper provides causal experimental evidence that an initial contract has a highly significant and...

Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However, there is a tradeoff, first pointed out by Simon (1951), between flexibility and employer moral hazard. An employment contract allows the principal to adjust the task quickly to...

Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However, there is a tradeoff, first pointed out by Simon (1951), between flexibility and employer moral hazard. An employment contract allows the principal to adjust the task quickly to...

In many cultures and industries gifts are given in order to influence the recipient, often at the expense of a third party. Examples include business gifts of firms and lobbyists. In a series of experiments, we show that, even without incentive or in-formational effects, small gifts strongly...

Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However, there is a tradeoff, first pointed out by Simon (1951), between flexibility and employer moral hazard. An employment contract allows the principal to adjust the task quickly to...