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The 2016 Nobel Memorial Prize in contract theory
Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2017
Nobel for their fundamental contributions to contract theory. This article offers a short summary and discussion of their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011626725
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Fairness and contract design
Fehr, Ernst; Klein, Alexander; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2005 - This version: November 5, 2005
, which offer important new insights into the interaction of contract choices, fairness and incentives. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371080
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Fairness, incentives and contractual incompleteness
Fehr, Ernst; Klein, Alexander; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2001
We show that concerns for fairness may have dramatic consequences for the optimal provision of incentives in a moral hazard context. Incentive contracts that are optimal when there are only selfish actors become inferior when some agents are concerned about fairness. Conversely, contracts that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398105
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Contributions of Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström to contract theory
Schmidt, Klaus M. - In: The Scandinavian journal of economics 119 (2017) 3, pp. 489-511
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011716954
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Social networks, optimal contract design, and present bias : four essays in applied economic theory
Schwarz, Marco - 2016
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012605052
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The interaction of explicit and implicit contracts
Schmidt, Klaus M. - 1994
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013260335
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Option contracts and renegotiation : a solution to the hold-up problem
Nöldeke, Georg; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 1993
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000872956
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Reference points, social norms, and fairness in contract renegotiations : conference paper
Bartling, Björn; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2013
-seller relationship with renegotiation. Our paper provides causal experimental evidence that an initial contract has a highly significant … threatpoints. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to strategically equivalent bargaining situations … in which no ex ante contract was written. The ex ante contract causes sellers to ask for markups that are 45 percent …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010342843
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Option Contracts and Renegotiation - a Solution to the Hold-Up Problem
Nöldeke, Georg; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2004
In this article, we analyze the canonical hold-up model of Hart and Moore under the assumption that the courts can verify delivery of the good by the seller. It is shown that no further renegotiation design is necessary to achieve the first best: simple option contracts, which give the seller...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014069602
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Loss aversion and inefficient renegotiation
Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M. - In: The review of economic studies 82 (2015) 1, pp. 297-332
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011720069