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Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts
Rosenkranz, Stephanie; Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: Economics letters 63 (1999) 2, pp. 181-185
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001398889
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Die Bedeutung von privater Information für Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Käufern und Verkäufern
Schmitz, Patrick W.; Sliwka, Dirk - In: Homo oeconomicus 15 (1998) 2, pp. 233-243
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001391537
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Ex post liability for harm vs. ex ante safety regulation : substitutes or complements? Comment
Ewerhart, Christian; Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: The American economic review 88 (1998) 4
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001251091
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Die theoretische Fundierung unvollständiger Verträge
Ewerhart, Christian - In: Homo oeconomicus 13 (1996) 4, pp. 501-514
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001214887
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Sollten Haftungsregeln durch Strafen ergänzt werden?
Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: Review of economics 48 (1997) 3, pp. 351-360
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001235524
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Randomization in coalition contracts
Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: Public choice 94 (1998) 3, pp. 341-353
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001238927
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Ausgewählte Anwendungen der Theorie unvollständiger Verträge
Ewerhart, Christian - In: Review of economics 48 (1997) 1, pp. 57-69
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001221707
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Der Lock-in-Effekt und das Hold-up-Problem
Ewerhart, Christian - In: Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium : WiSt ; … 26 (1997) 7, pp. 361-363
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001222153
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Hidden action and outcome contractibility : an expperimental test of contract theory
Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W. - 2015
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011440905
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Optimal contracting with verifiable ex post signals
Kessler, Anke S.; Lülfesmann, Christoph; Schmitz, … - 2000
We study an adverse selection problem in which information that is imperfectly correlated with the agent's type becomes public ex post. Unbounded penalties are ruled out by assuming that the agent is wealth constrained. The following conclusions emerge. If the agent's utility is increasing in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538996