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Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach
Schmitz, Patrick W. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013
In the property rights approach to the theory of the firm (Hart, 1995), parties bargain about whether or not to collaborate after non-contractible investments have been made. Most contributions apply the regular Nash bargaining solution. We explore the implications of using the generalized Nash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011113898
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Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach
Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: Economics Letters 119 (2013) 3, pp. 336-339
We reconsider the property rights approach to the theory of the firm based on incomplete contracts. We explore the implications of different degrees of relationship-specificity when there are two parties, A and B, who can make investments in physical capital (instead of human capital). If...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010664120
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Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach
Schmitz, Patrick W. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013
We reconsider the property rights approach to the theory of the firm based on incomplete contracts. We explore the implications of different degrees of relationship-specificity when there are two parties, A and B, who can make investments in physical capital (instead of human capital). If...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011112525
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Completely Relationship-Specific Investments, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Theory
Schmitz, Patrick W. - 2023
show that if negotiations after the investment stage require transaction costs to be paid, then ownership matters even when …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014348960
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Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm
Schmitz, Patrick W. - 2020
an investment decision, B-ownership can yield higher investment incentives. Moreover, ownership matters even when …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012845008
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Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm
Schmitz, Patrick W. - 2019
is symmetric. Ownership matters for investment incentives, provided that investments are partly relationship-specific. We … investments). It turns out that if there is asymmetric information, then ownership matters for investment incentives and for the … expected total surplus. Specifically, giving ownership to party can be optimal, even when only party has to make an investment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012891754
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On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries
Schmitz, Patrick W. - 2021
Consider a buyer and a seller who have agreed to trade an intermediate good. It is ex-post efficient to adapt the good to the prevailing state of the world. The seller has private information about the costs of adapting the good. In the case of non-integration, the buyer has no possibility to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013236062
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Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach
Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: Economics Letters 119 (2013) 1, pp. 28-31
In the property rights approach to the theory of the firm (Hart, 1995), parties bargain about whether or not to collaborate after non-contractible investments have been made. Most contributions apply the regular Nash bargaining solution. We explore the implications of using the generalized Nash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010662387
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The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability
Schmitz, Patrick W. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
's investment incentives are increasing in his bargaining power. Yet, given limited liability, overinvestments may occur and the … inventor's investment incentives may be decreasing in his bargaining power. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011108911
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The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability
Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: Economics Letters 117 (2012) 3, pp. 841-843
’s investment incentives are increasing in his bargaining power. Yet, given limited liability, overinvestments may occur and the … inventor’s investment incentives may be decreasing in his bargaining power. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594088