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The virtue of being underestimated : a note on discriminatory contracts in hidden information models
Schnedler, Wendelin - 2001 - This Version: June 2001
the optimal contract. A priori more productive (hazard rate dominant) agents work less, enjoy lower rents, but generate a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539692
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The virtue of being underestimated : a note on discriminatory contracts in hidden information models
Schnedler, Wendelin - 2001
the optimal contract. A priori more productive (hazard rate dominant) agents work less, enjoy lower rents, but generate a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011403219
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The virtue of being underestimated : a note on discriminatory contracts in hidden information models
Schnedler, Wendelin - In: Economics letters 75 (2002) 2, pp. 171-178
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001650972
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The virtue of being underestimated : a note on discriminatory contracts in hidden information models
Schnedler, Wendelin - 2001
the optimal contract. A priori more productive (hazard rate dominant) agents work less, enjoy lower rents, but generate a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001630241
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The virtue of being underestimated : a note on discriminatory contracts in hidden information models
Schnedler, Wendelin - 2001
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001600025
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The Virtue of Being Underestimated : A Note on Discriminatory Contracts in Hidden Information Models
Schnedler, Wendelin - 2021
the optimal contract. A priori more productive (hazard rate dominant)agents work less, enjoy lower rents, but generate a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013320838
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The Virtue of Being Underestimated: A Note on Discriminatory Contracts in Hidden Information Models
Schnedler, Wendelin - 2001
the optimal contract. A priori more productive (hazard rate dominant) agents work less, enjoy lower rents, but generate a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262549
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The Virtue of Being Underestimated: A Note on Discriminatory Contracts in Hidden Information Models
Schnedler, Wendelin - 2001
the optimal contract. A priori more productive (hazard rate dominant) agents work less, enjoy lower rents, but generate a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317663
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The Virtue of Being Underestimated: A Note on Discriminatory Contracts in Hidden Information Models
Schnedler, Wendelin - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2001
the optimal contract. A priori more productive (hazard rate dominant) agents work less, enjoy lower rents, but generate a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761912
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The Virtue of Being Underestimated: A Note on Discriminatory Contracts in Hidden Information Models
Schnedler, Wendelin - University of Bonn, Germany - 2001
the optimal contract. A priori more productive (hazard rate dominant) agents work less, enjoy lower rents, but generate a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005032208