At least to some extent migration behavior is the outcome of a preference for migration. The pattern of migration as an outcome of a preference for migration depends on two key factors: imitation technology and migration feasibility. We show that these factors jointly determine the outcome of a...

Quite often established migrants offer assistance and support that facilitate the arrival of new migrants. Why would migrants want other migrants to join them - so much so as to be willing to pay for them to come? We suggest a rationale. Our modeling framework is capable of explaining several...

We provide an analytical-behavioral explanation for the observed positive relationship between income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, and the incentive to migrate. We show that a higher total relative deprivation of a population leads to a stronger incentive to engage in...

This paper studies the growth dynamics of a developing country under migration. Assuming that human capital formation is subject to a strong enough, positive intertemporal externality, the prospect of migration will increase growth in the home country in the long run. If the external effect is...

If some of the returns to migration accrue from return migration, the optimal duration of migration may be shorter than the feasible duration of migration. We develop a model that provides and highlights conditions under which return migration takes place even though a reversal of the...

A migration network is modeled as a mutually beneficial cooperative agreement between financially-constrained individuals who seek to finance and expedite their migration. The cooperation agreement creates a network: "established" migrants contract to support the subsequent migration of others...

A migration network is modeled as a mutually beneficial cooperative agreement between financially-constrained individuals who seek to finance and expedite their migration. The cooperation agreement creates a network: "established" migrants contract to support the subsequent migration of others...

This paper develops a one sector, two-input model with endogenous human capital formation. The two inputs are two types of skilled labor: "engineering," which exerts a positive externality on total factor productivity, and "law", which does not. The paper shows that a marginal prospect of...

This paper develops a one sector, two-input model with endogenous human capital formation. The two inputs are two types of skilled labor: "engineering," which exerts a positive externality on total factor productivity, and "law," which does not. The paper shows that a marginal prospect of...

This paper develops a one sector, two-input model with endogenous human capital formation. The two inputs are two types of skilled labor: “engineering,” which exerts a positive externality on total factor productivity, and “law,” which does not. The paper shows that a marginal prospect...