We introduce intermediation frictions into the classical monetary model with fully flexible prices. Trade in financial assets occurs through intermediaries who bargain over a full set of state-contingent claims with their customers. Monetary policy is redistributive and affects intermediaries'...

We study the general problem of information design for a policymaker—a central bank—that communicates its private information (the ``state") to the public. We show that it is optimal for the policymaker to partition the state space into a finite number of ``clusters” and to communicate to...

We develop a general equilibrium model with intermediaries at the heart of international financial markets. Global intermediaries bargain with households and extract rents for providing access to foreign claims. The behavior of intermediaries, by tilting state prices, breaks monetary neutrality...

How should an agent (the sender) observing multi-dimensional data (the state vector) persuade another agent to take the desired action? We show that it is always optimal for the sender to perform a (non-linear) dimension reduction by projecting the state vector onto a lower-dimensional object...

We study the general problem of Bayesian persuasion (optimal information design) with continuous actions and continuous state space in arbitrary dimensions. First, we show that with a finite signal space, the optimal information design is always given by a partition. Second, we take the limit of...

We develop a general equilibrium model with intermediaries at the heart of international financial markets. In our model, intermediaries bargain with their customers and extract rents for providing access to foreign claims. The behavior of intermediaries, by tilting state prices, generates an...