Nous testons en laboratoire trois instruments destinés à réguler l’exploitation d’une ressource commune par des agents hétérogènes : un système de taxes et de subventions, des quotas individuels transférables et non transférables. Nous proposons un modèle dans lequel l’objectif...

[eng] We conduct a laboratory experiment to test three regulations imposed on a common-pool resource game : an access fee and subsidy system, transferable quotas , and non-transferable quotas. Theory predicts that they all reduce resource use from free access to the same target level without...

In a laboratory experiment we test three regulations imposed on a common-pool resource game with heterogeneous users: an access fee and subsidy scheme, transferable quotas and non-transferable quotas. We calibrate the game so that all regulations improve users’ profits compared to free-access...

Purpose – Regulating common-pool resources is welfare enhancing for society but not necessarily for all users who may therefore oppose regulations. The purpose of this paper is to examine the short-term impact of common-pool resource regulations on welfare distribution....