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Post-Resolution Treatment of Depositors At Failed Banks : Implications for the Severity of Banking Crises, Systemic Risk, and too-Big-To-Fail
Kaufman, George G. - 2001
Losses may accrue to depositors at insolvent banks both at and after the time of official resolution. Losses at resolution occur because of poor closure rules and regulatory forbearance. Losses after resolution occur if depositors'' access to their claims is delayed or ""frozen."" While the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014403810
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Post-Resolution Treatment of Depositors At Failed Banks; Implications for the Severity of Banking Crises, Systemic Risk, and too-Big-To-Fail
Kaufman, George G.; Seelig, Steven A. - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2001
Losses may accrue to depositors at insolvent banks both at and after the time of official resolution. Losses at resolution occur because of poor closure rules and regulatory forbearance. Losses after resolution occur if depositors' access to their claims is delayed or "frozen." While the sources...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005825969
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Post-resolution treatment of depositors at failed banks: implications for the severity of banking crises, systemic risk, and too-big-to-fail
Kaufman, George G.; Seelig, Steven A. - Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago - 2000
Bank failures are widely viewed in all countries as more damaging to the economy than the failure of other firms of similar size for a number of reasons. The failures may produce losses to depositors and other creditors, break long-standing bank-customers loan relationships, disrupt the payments...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005419978
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Post-resolution treatment of depositors at failed banks : implications for the severity of banking crises, systemic risk, and too-big-to-fail
Kaufman, George G.; Seelig, Steven A. - 2001
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001597726
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Post-resolution treatment of depositors at failed banks : implications for the severity of banking cises, systemi risk, and too big to fail
Kaufman, George G.; Seelig, Steven A. - In: Economic perspectives 26 (2002) 2, pp. 27-41
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001696444
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Post-resolution treatment of depositors at failed banks: implications for the serverity of banking crises, systemic risk, and too-big-to-fail
Kaufman, George G.; Seelig, Steven A. - In: Bank restructuring and resolution, (pp. 163-183). 2006
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003413598
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Post-Resolution Treatment of Depositors at Failed Banks : Implications for the Severity of Banking Crises, Systemic Risk, and Too-Big-To-Fail
Kaufman, George G. - 2006
Losses may accrue to depositors at insolvent banks both at and after the time of official resolution. Losses at resolution occur because of poor closure rules and regulatory forbearance. Losses after resolution occur if depositors' access to their claims is delayed or frozen. While the sources...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012782753