Showing 1 - 10 of 145
We investigate social norms for dictator game giving using a recently proposed norm-elicitation procedure (Krupka and … Weber, 2013). We elicit norms separately from dictator, recipient, and disinterested third party respondents and find that … elicited norms are stable and insensitive to the role of the respondent. The results support the use of this procedure as a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010436501
We investigate a version of the classic Colonel Blotto game in which individual battles may have different values. Two players allocate a fixed budget across battlefields and each battlefield is won by the player who allocates the most to that battlefield. The winner of the game is the player...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010224988
We experimentally examine how the incentive to defect in a social dilemma affects conditional cooperation. In our first study we conduct online experiments in which subjects play eight Sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma games with payoffs systematically varied across games. We find that few second...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014077010
We experimentally examine how incentives affect conditional cooperation (i.e., cooperating in response to cooperation and defecting in response to defection) in social dilemmas. In our first study, subjects play eight Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma games with varying payoffs. We elicit second...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014529316
We investigate social norms for dictator game giving using a recently proposed norm-elicitation procedure (Krupka and … Weber, 2013). We elicit norms separately from dictator, recipient, and disinterested third party respondents and find that … elicited norms are stable and insensitive to the role of the respondent. The results support the use of this procedure as a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444307
We investigate social norms for dictator game giving using a recently proposed norm-elicitation procedure (Krupka and … Weber, 2013). We elicit norms separately from dictator, recipient, and disinterested third party respondents and find that … elicited norms are stable and insensitive to the role of the respondent. The results support the use of this procedure as a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263441
We examine the relationship between confidence in own absolute performance and risk attitudes using two confidence elicitation procedures: self-reported (non-incentivised) confidence and an incentivised procedure that elicits the certainty equivalent of a bet based on performance. The former...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011434351
We examine the relationship between confidence in own absolute performance and risk attitudes using two elicitation procedures: self-reported (non-incentivised) confidence and an incentivised procedure that elicits the certainty equivalent of a bet based on performance. The former procedure...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010439679
We present an experiment to investigate the source of disappointment aversion in a sequential real-effort competition. Specifically, we study the contribution of social comparison effects to the disappointment aversion previously identified in a two-person real-effort competition (Gill and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011647659
We present an experiment to investigate the source of disappointment aversion in a sequential real-effort competition. Specifically, we study the contribution of social comparison effects to the disappointment aversion previously identified in a two-person real-effort competition (Gill and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011658021