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experiment. In the experiment a principal pays a wage to each of two agents, who then make effort choices sequentially. In our … preferences (Fehr-Schmidt, 1999). As we show from a norms-elicitation experiment, it is also consistent with social norms … explanation for the observed peer effect. -- peer effects ; social influence ; gift-exchange ; experiment ; social preferences …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009530683
experiment. In the experiment a principal pays a wage to each of two agents, who then make effort choices sequentially. In our … preferences (Fehr-Schmidt, 1999). As we show from a norms-elicitation experiment, it is also consistent with social norms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013110204
We present an experiment to investigate the source of disappointment aversion in a sequential real-effort competition … Prowse experiment, where the latter treatment removes the scope for social comparisons. If disappointment aversion simply …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011653482
Prowse experiment are compared, where the latter treatment involves a competition against Nature and removes the scope for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012029800
We present an experiment to investigate the source of disappointment aversion in a sequential real-effort competition … Prowse experiment, where the latter treatment removes the scope for social comparisons. If disappointment aversion simply …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011698656
We present an experiment to investigate the source of disappointment aversion in a sequential real-effort competition … Prowse experiment, where the latter treatment removes the scope for social comparisons. If disappointment aversion simply …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012956031
We present an experiment to investigate the source of disappointment aversion in a sequential real-effort competition … Prowse experiment, where the latter treatment removes the scope for social comparisons. If disappointment aversion simply …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012953949
We use laboratory experiments to study communication games with partially verifiable information. In these games, based on Glazer and Rubinstein (2004, 2006), an informed sender sends a two-dimensional message to a receiver, but only one dimension of the message can be verified. We compare a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012239483
We use laboratory experiments to study communication games with partially verifiable information. In these games, based on Glazer and Rubinstein (2004, 2006), an informed sender sends a two-dimensional message to a receiver, but only one dimension of the message can be verified. We compare a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011897228
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011446237