Similar Search Results

Divisible-good uniform price auctions: The role of allocation rules and communication among bidders

Sefton, Martin; Zhang, Ping - 2009

We use laboratory experiments to compare allocation rules in uniform price divisible good auctions. 'Standard' and 'uniform' allocation rules admit different types of low-price equilibria, which are eliminated by a 'hybrid' rule. We observe little evidence of revenue differences among the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277504

Divisible-good uniform price auctions: the role of allocation rules and communication among bidders

Sefton, Martin; Zhang, Ping - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2009

We use laboratory experiments to compare allocation rules in uniform price divisible good auctions. “Standard” and “uniform” allocation rules admit different types of low-price equilibria, which are eliminated by a “hybrid” rule. We observe little evidence of revenue differences...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008557033

Divisible-good uniform price auctions: the role of allocation rules and communication among bidders

Sefton, Martin; Zhang, Ping - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010552246

Divisible-good uniform price auctions : the role of allocation rules and communication among bidders

Sefton, Martin; Zhang, Ping - 2009

that the standard allocation rule is particularly vulnerable to collusive equilibria. -- experiment ; uniform price auction … ; multi-unit auction ; divisible-good auction ; allocation rule ; communication …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003898823

A laboratory study of advertising and price competition

Morgan, John (contributor); Orzen, Henrik (contributor); … - 2003 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001777064

A laboratory study of advertising and price competition

Morgan, John; Orzen, Henrik; Sefton, Martin - In: European economic review : EER 50 (2006) 2, pp. 323-347

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003280411

Multi-Unit Auctions : A Comparison of Static and Dynamic Mechanisms

Manelli, Alejandro Marcelo; Sefton, Martin; Wilner, … - 2000

We compare, experimentally, the Vickrey auction and an ascending-price auction recently introduced by Ausubel (1997 … valuations either have a common-value component or are private information. We find that the Ausubel auction is less prone to … overbidding and may yield higher revenue than the Vickrey auction. The gain in revenue seems to be coupled with a loss of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014172565

Funding Public Goods with Lotteries : Experimental Evidence

Sefton, Martin; Morgan, John - 2004

Why do individuals participate in charitable gambling and state-run lotteries? In contrast to previous explanations that rely on risk-preference or pure love of gambling motives, we present a model where risk-neutral expected utility maximizers explicitly recognize that lotteries are being used...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014073845

Who makes a good leader? Social preferences and leading-by-example

Gächter, Simon; Nosenzo, Daniele; Renner, Elke; … - 2008

We examine the effects of social preferences and beliefs about the social preferences of others in a simple leader-follower voluntary contributions game. We find that groups perform best when led by those who are reciprocally oriented. Part of the effect can be explained by a false consensus...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268939

Sequential versus simultaneous contributions to public goods: experimental evidence

Gächter, Simon; Nosenzo, Daniele; Renner, Elke; … - 2009

We report an experiment comparing sequential and simultaneous contributions to a public good in a quasi-linear two-person setting (Varian, Journal of Public Economics, 1994). Our findings support the theoretical argument that sequential contributions result in lower overall provision than...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273783