experiment. In the experiment a principal pays a wage to each of two agents, who then make effort choices sequentially. In our … preferences (Fehr-Schmidt, 1999). As we show from a norms-elicitation experiment, it is also consistent with social norms … explanation for the observed peer effect. -- peer effects ; social influence ; gift-exchange ; experiment ; social preferences …

experiment. In the experiment a principal pays a wage to each of two agents, who then make effort choices sequentially. In our … preferences (Fehr-Schmidt, 1999). As we show from a norms-elicitation experiment, it is also consistent with social norms … explanation for the observed peer effect. -- peer effects ; social influence ; gift-exchange ; experiment ; social preferences …

experiment. In the experiment a principal pays a wage to each of two agents, who then make effort choices sequentially. We find … also show, by conducting an experiment to measure social norms, that it is consistent with social norm compliance. We … explanation for observed peer effects. -- peer effects ; social influence ; gift-exchange ; experiment ; social preferences …

experiment. In the experiment a principal pays a wage to each of two agents, who then make effort choices sequentially. In our … preferences (Fehr-Schmidt, 1999). As we show from a norms-elicitation experiment, it is also consistent with social norms …

experiment. In the experiment a principal pays a wage to each of two agents, who then make effort choices sequentially. In our … preferences (Fehr-Schmidt, 1999). As we show from a norms-elicitation experiment, it is also consistent with social norms …

experiment. In the experiment a principal pays a wage to each of two agents, who then make effort choices sequentially. In our … preferences (Fehr-Schmidt, 1999). As we show from a norms-elicitation experiment, it is also consistent with social norms …

choices from a laboratory experiment. The equilibrium predicts that the large battlefield receives more than a proportional …