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Peer effects in pro-social behaviour : social norms or social preferences?
Gächter, Simon; Nosenzo, Daniele; Sefton, Martin - 2012
experiment. In the experiment a principal pays a wage to each of two agents, who then make effort choices sequentially. In our … preferences (Fehr-Schmidt, 1999). As we show from a norms-elicitation experiment, it is also consistent with social norms … explanation for the observed peer effect. -- peer effects ; social influence ; gift-exchange ; experiment ; social preferences …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009535546
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Peer effects in pro-social behavior : social norms or social preferences?
Gächter, Simon; Nosenzo, Daniele; Sefton, Martin - 2012
experiment. In the experiment a principal pays a wage to each of two agents, who then make effort choices sequentially. In our … preferences (Fehr-Schmidt, 1999). As we show from a norms-elicitation experiment, it is also consistent with social norms … explanation for the observed peer effect. -- peer effects ; social influence ; gift-exchange ; experiment ; social preferences …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009530683
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Peer effects in pro-social behavior: social norms or social preferences?
Gächter, Simon; Nosenzo, Daniele; Sefton, Martin - 2010
experiment. In the experiment a principal pays a wage to each of two agents, who then make effort choices sequentially. We find … also show, by conducting an experiment to measure social norms, that it is consistent with social norm compliance. We … explanation for observed peer effects. -- peer effects ; social influence ; gift-exchange ; experiment ; social preferences …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008933785
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Peer effects in pro-social behavior : social norms or social preferences?
Gächter, Simon; Nosenzo, Daniele; Sefton, Martin - In: Journal of the European Economic Association 11 (2013) 3, pp. 548-573
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009779345
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Peer Effects in Pro-Social Behavior : Social Norms or Social Preferences?
Gaechter, Simon - 2012
experiment. In the experiment a principal pays a wage to each of two agents, who then make effort choices sequentially. In our … preferences (Fehr-Schmidt, 1999). As we show from a norms-elicitation experiment, it is also consistent with social norms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013110204
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Social Preferences and the Variability of Conditional Cooperation
Baader, Malte; Gaechter, Simon; Lee, Kyeongtae; Sefton, … - 2022
We experimentally examine how the incentive to defect in a social dilemma affects conditional cooperation. In our first study we conduct online experiments in which subjects play eight Sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma games with payoffs systematically varied across games. We find that few second...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014077010
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Social preferences and the variability of conditional cooperation
Baader, Malte; Gächter, Simon; Lee, Kyeongtae; Sefton, … - 2024
We experimentally examine how incentives affect conditional cooperation (i.e., cooperating in response to cooperation and defecting in response to defection) in social dilemmas. In our first study, subjects play eight Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma games with varying payoffs. We elicit second...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014529316
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Peer effects in pro-social behavior: Social norms or social preferences?
Gächter, Simon; Nosenzo, Daniele; Sefton, Martin - 2012
experiment. In the experiment a principal pays a wage to each of two agents, who then make effort choices sequentially. In our … preferences (Fehr-Schmidt, 1999). As we show from a norms-elicitation experiment, it is also consistent with social norms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282212
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Peer effects in pro-social behaviour: Social norms or social preferences?
Gächter, Simon; Nosenzo, Daniele; Sefton, Martin - 2012
experiment. In the experiment a principal pays a wage to each of two agents, who then make effort choices sequentially. In our … preferences (Fehr-Schmidt, 1999). As we show from a norms-elicitation experiment, it is also consistent with social norms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010392425
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To tender or not to tender? : deliberate and exogenous sunk costs in a public good game
Heine, Florian; Sefton, Martin - In: Games 9 (2018) 3/41, pp. 1-28
In an experimental study, we compare individual willingness to cooperate in a public good game after an initial team contest phase. While players in the treatment setup make a conscious decision on how much to invest in the contest, this decision is exogenously imposed on players in the control...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011891197