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All-pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes

Minchuk, Yizhaq; Sela, Aner - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 130-134

We study all-pay auctions with multiple prizes. The players have the same value for all the certain prizes except for one uncertain prize for which each player has a private value. We characterize the equilibrium strategy and show that, independent of the ranking of the uncertain prize, if the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117138

The Optimal Rewards in Contests

Cohen, Chen; Kaplan, Todd R.; Sela, Aner - Business School, University of Exeter - 2004

We study all-pay contests under incomplete information where the reward is a function of the contestant's type and also …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008852355

All-pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes

Minchuk, Yizhaq; Sela, Aner - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

We study all-pay auctions with multiple prizes. The players have the same value for all the certain prizes except for one uncertain prize for which each player has a private value. We characterize the equilibrium strategy and show that if the number of prizes is smaller than the number of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083545

Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests

Moldovanu, Benny; Sela, Aner; Shi, Xianwen - University of Toronto, Department of Economics - 2010

We study optimal contest design in situations where the designer can reward high performance agents with positive prizes and punish low performance agents with negative prizes. We link the optimal prize structure to the curvature of distribution of abilities in the population. In particular, we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008529178

Effective Political Contests

Kaplan, Todd R.; Sela, Aner - Economics Department, Ben Gurion University of the Negev - 2008

We study two-stage political contests with private entry costs. We show that these political contests could be …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008577379

Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests

Modovanu, Benny; Sela, Aner; Shi, Xianwen - Economics Department, Ben Gurion University of the Negev - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008498311

Effective Political Contests

Kaplan, Todd; Sela, Aner - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

We study two-stage political contests with private entry costs. We show that these political contests could be …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504307

Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests

Moldovanu, Benny; Sela, Aner; Shi, Xianwen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504366

Allocation of Prizes in Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions

Cohen, Chen; Sela, Aner - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

-prize and multiple-prize contests and show that allocation of several prizes may be optimal for a contest designer who maximizes …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504495

Contests with Ties

Cohen, Chen; Sela, Aner - In: Contributions to Theoretical Economics 7 (2007) 1, pp. 1398-1398

We study two-player all-pay contests in which there is a positive probability of a tied outcome. We show that the … the prize for winning. The implications of this result are twofold. First, in symmetric one-stage contests, the designer …-third of the prize for winning. Second, in multi-stage contests, the designer should not limit the number of stages (tie …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005579657