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The Optimal Rewards in Contests
Cohen, Chen; Kaplan, Todd R.; Sela, Aner - 2004
We study all-pay contests under incomplete information where the reward is a function of the contestant's type and also of his effort. We analyze the optimal reward for the designer when the reward is either multiplicatively separable or additively separable in effort and type. In the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014069817
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All-Pay Auctions with Weakly Risk-Averse Buyers
Fibich, Gadi; Gavious, Arieh; Sela, Aner - 2004
would bid in a first-price auction. 3) Buyers' expected utilities in an all-pay auction are lower than in a first …-price auction. 4) The seller's expected payoff in an all-pay auction may be either higher or lower than in the risk neutral case. 5 …) The seller's expected payoff in an all-pay auction may be either higher or lower than in a first-price auction. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011324891
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Optimal Seedings in Elimination Tournaments
Groh, Christian; Moldovanu, Benny; Sela, Aner; Sunde, Uwe - 2003
-wise match is modeled as an all-pay auction where the winner gets the right to compete at the next round. Equilibrium efforts are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333743
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Contests for status
Moldovanu, Benny; Sela, Aner; Shi, Xianwen - 2005
We study the optimal design of organizations under the assumption that agents in a contest care about their relative position. A judicious definition of status categories can be used by a principal in order to influence the agents' performance. We first consider a pure status case where there...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010373503
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Optimal seedings in elimination tournaments
Groh, Christian; Moldovanu, Benny; Sela, Aner; Sunde, Uwe - 2003
-wise match is modeled as an all-pay auction where the winner gets the right to compete at the next round. Equilibrium efforts are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343975
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Prebidding vs. Postbidding in First-Price Auctions with and Without Head-Starts
Minchuk, Yizhaq - 2015
bid either before (prebidding auction) or after (postbidding auction) all the other bidders. We show that for relatively … small (high) values of bidder 1 the prebidding auction yields a lower (higher) expected highest bid than the postbidding … auction. However, by giving head-starts, for relatively small (high) values of bidder 1, the prebidding auction yields a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013013084
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Carrots and Sticks : Prizes and Punishments in Contests
Moldovanu, Benny - 2009
We study optimal contest design in situations where the designer can reward high performance agents with positive prizes and punish low performance agents with negative prizes. We link the optimal prize structure to the curvature of distribution of abilities in the population. In particular, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012720665
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All-pay auctions with weakly risk-averse buyers
Fibich, Gadi; Gavious, Arieh; Sela, Aner - 2004
would bid in a first-price auction. 3) Buyers' expected utilities in an all-pay auction are lower than in a first …-price auction. 4) The seller's expected payoff in an all-pay auction may be either higher or lower than in the risk neutral case. 5 …) The seller's expected payoff in an all-pay auction may be either higher or lower than in a first-price auction. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599258
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Common-Value All-Pay Auctions with Asymmetric Information and Bid Caps
Einy, Ezra; Haimanko, Ori; Orzach, Ram; Sela, Aner - Economics Department, Ben Gurion University of the Negev - 2014
, sufficiently high (but still binding) bid caps do not change the players' expected total effort compared to the benchmark auction …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010960213
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TULLOCK CONTESTS WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
Einy, Ezra; Haimanko, Ori; Moreno, Diego; Sela, Aner; … - Economics Department, Ben Gurion University of the Negev - 2013
Under standard assumptions about players'cost functions, we show that a Tullock contest with asymmetric information has a pure strategy equilibrium. Next we study Tullock contests in which players have a common value and a common state-independent linear cost function. A two-player contest in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011272224