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The Optimal Rewards in Contests
Cohen, Chen; Kaplan, Todd R.; Sela, Aner - 2004
We study all-pay contests under incomplete information where the reward is a function of the contestant's type and also of his effort. We analyze the optimal reward for the designer when the reward is either multiplicatively separable or additively separable in effort and type. In the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014069817
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A Learning Approach to Auctions
Monderer, Dov; Sela, Aner - 1998
We analyze a repeated first-price auction in which the types of the players are determined before the first round. It … fictitious play learning scheme, then for sufficiently large time, the players' bids are in equilibrium in the one-shot auction …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014091033
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Optimal Seedings in Elimination Tournaments
Groh, Christian; Moldovanu, Benny; Sela, Aner; Sunde, Uwe - 2003
-wise match is modeled as an all-pay auction where the winner gets the right to compete at the next round. Equilibrium efforts are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333743
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All-Pay Auctions with Weakly Risk-Averse Buyers
Fibich, Gadi; Gavious, Arieh; Sela, Aner - 2004
would bid in a first-price auction. 3) Buyers' expected utilities in an all-pay auction are lower than in a first …-price auction. 4) The seller's expected payoff in an all-pay auction may be either higher or lower than in the risk neutral case. 5 …) The seller's expected payoff in an all-pay auction may be either higher or lower than in a first-price auction. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011324891
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Effective Political Contests
Kaplan, Todd; Sela, Aner - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
We study two-stage political contests with private entry costs. We show that these political contests could be ineffective, namely, the chance of low ability candidates participating in the contest might be higher than the chance of high ability candidates participating in the contest (and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504307
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Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests
Moldovanu, Benny; Sela, Aner; Shi, Xianwen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
We study optimal contest design in situations where the designer can reward high performance agents with positive prizes and punish low performance agents with negative prizes. We link the optimal prize structure to the curvature of distribution of abilities in the population. In particular, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504366
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Allocation of Prizes in Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions
Cohen, Chen; Sela, Aner - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
We study asymmetric all-pay auctions with multiple objects where players’ values for the objects are common knowledge. The players have different values for the objects but they have the same ranking. The contest designer may award one prize including all the objects to the player with the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504495
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Auctions with Private Entry Costs
Kaplan, Todd; Sela, Aner - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
necessarily in the same direction. The auction designs that maximize the social surplus or the seller’s pay-off are analysed. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504584
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Dominant strategies, superior information, and winner's curse in second-price auctions
Haimanko, Ori; Sela, Aner; Orzach, Ram; Einy, Ezra - In: International Journal of Game Theory 30 (2002) 3, pp. 405-419
In a general model of common-value second-price auctions with differential information, we show equivalence between the following characteristics of a bidder: (i) having a dominant strategy; (ii) possessing superior information; (iii) being immune from winner's curse. When a dominant strategy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005375620
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A Learning Approach to Auctions
Monderer, Dov; Hon-Snir, Shlomit; Sela, Aner - University of Bonn, Germany - 1996
We analyze a repeated first-price auction in which the types of the players are determined before the first round. It … fictitious play learning scheme, then for sufficiently large time, the players' bid are in equilibrium in the one-shot auction in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968224