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All-pay auctions with weakly risk-averse buyers

Fibich, Gadi; Gavious, Arieh; Sela, Aner - 2004

We use perturbation analysis to study independent private-value all-pay auctions with weakly risk-averse buyers. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599258

Common-Value All-Pay Auctions with Asymmetric Information and Bid Caps

Einy, Ezra; Haimanko, Ori; Orzach, Ram; Sela, Aner - Economics Department, Ben Gurion University of the Negev - 2014

We study two-player common-value all-pay auctions (contests) with asymmetric information under the assumption that one … results for all-pay auctions with complete information, and show that in all-pay auctions with asymmetric information …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010960213

TULLOCK CONTESTS WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

Einy, Ezra; Haimanko, Ori; Moreno, Diego; Sela, Aner; … - Economics Department, Ben Gurion University of the Negev - 2013

Under standard assumptions about players'cost functions, we show that a Tullock contest with asymmetric information has a pure strategy equilibrium. Next we study Tullock contests in which players have a common value and a common state-independent linear cost function. A two-player contest in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011272224

COMMON-VALUE ALL-PAY AUCTIONS WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

Einy, Ezra; Haimanko, Ori; Orzach, Ram; Sela, Aner - Economics Department, Ben Gurion University of the Negev - 2013

We study two-player common-value all-pay auctions in which the players have ex-ante asymmetric information represented … by finite partitions of the set of possible values of winning. We consider two families of such auctions: in the first … over his opponent. We show that there exists a unique equilibrium in auctions with IA and explicitly characterize it; for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011272249

Dominant strategies, superior information, and winner's curse in second-price auctions

Haimanko, Ori; Sela, Aner; Orzach, Ram; Einy, Ezra - In: International Journal of Game Theory 30 (2002) 3, pp. 405-419

In a general model of common-value second-price auctions with differential information, we show equivalence between the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005375620

CAPS IN SEQUENTIAL CONTESTS

Sela, Aner; Megidish, Reut - Economics Department, Ben Gurion University of the Negev - 2010

We study a sequential two-stage all-pay auction with two identical prizes. In each stage, the players compete for one prize and each player may win either one or two prizes. The designer may impose a cap on the players' bids in each of the stages. We analyze the equilibrium in this sequential...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727312

All-Pay Auctions with Weakly Risk-Averse Buyers

Fibich, Gadi; Gavious, Arieh; Sela, Aner - 2004

We use perturbation analysis to study independent private-value all-pay auctions with weakly risk-averse buyers. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014073423

Assortative matching by lottery contests

Cohen, Chen; Rabi, Ishay; Sela, Aner - In: Games 13 (2022) 5, pp. 1-20

We study two-sided matching contests with two sets, A and B, each of which includes a finite number of heterogeneous agents with commonly known types. The agents in each set compete in a lottery (Tullock) contest, and then are assortatively matched, namely, the winner of set A is matched with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418053

The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests

Moldovanu, Benny; Sela, Aner - In: American Economic Review 91 (2001) 3, pp. 542-558

We study a contest with multiple, nonidentical prizes. Participants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) affecting their costs of effort. The contestant with the highest effort wins the first prize, the contestant with the second-highest effort wins the second prize, and so on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005821060

Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests

Modovanu, Benny; Sela, Aner; Shi, Xianwen - Economics Department, Ben Gurion University of the Negev - 2008

We study optimal contest design in situations where the designer can reward high performance agents with positive prizes and punish low performance agents with negative prizes. We link the optimal prize structure to the curvature of distribution of abilities in the population. In particular, we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008498311