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A characterization of single-peaked preferences via random social choice functions

Chatterji, Shurojit; Sen, Arunava; Zeng, Huaxia - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 11 (2016) 2, pp. 711-733

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011500770

Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains

Peters, Hans; Roy, Souvik; Sen, Arunava; Storcken, Ton - In: Journal of mathematical economics 52 (2014), pp. 123-127

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010495156

On cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good

Massó, Jordi; Nicolò, Antonio; Sen, Arunava; Sharma, … - In: Journal of economic theory 155 (2015), pp. 30-49

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011326865

Strategy-proof probabilistic mechanisms in economies with pure public goods

Dutta, Bhaskar; Peters, Hans J. M.; Sen, Arunava - In: Journal of economic theory 106 (2002) 2, pp. 392-416

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001721417

The structure of strategy-proof random social choice functions over product domans and lexicographically separable preferences

Chatterji, Shurojit; Roy, Souvik; Sen, Arunava - In: Journal of mathematical economics 48 (2012) 6, pp. 353-366

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009689452

Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes

Dutta, Bhaskar; Peters, Hans; Sen, Arunava - In: Social choice and welfare 28 (2007) 1, pp. 163-179

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003405700

Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes

Dutta, Bhaskar (contributor); Peters, Hans J. M. (contributor) - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002833991

Themarriage problem with interdependent preferences

Pourpouneh, Mohsen; Ramezanian, Rasoul; Sen, Arunava - In: International game theory review 22 (2020) 2, pp. 1-16

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012582472

A characterization of single-peaked preferences via random social choice functions

Chatterji, Shurojit; Sen, Arunava; Zeng, Huaxia - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 2, pp. 711-733

The paper proves the following result: every path-connected domain of preferences that admits a strategy-proof, unanimous, tops-only random social choice function satisfying a compromise property, is single-peaked. Conversely, every single-peaked domain admits a random social choice function...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671964

Virtual implementation in Nash equilibrium

Abreu, Dilip; Sen, Arunava - 1990

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000789171