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A decentralized market with common values uncertainty : non-steady states
Blouin, Max; Serrano, Roberto - 1998
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011504686
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A comparison of the average prekernel and the prekernel
Serrano, Roberto; Shimomura, Ken-ichi - 2001
payoffs of a game where each player faces the possibility of bargaining at random against any other player. In the kooperative …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318958
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A Decentralized Market with Common Values Uncertainty: Non-Steady States
Blouin, Max; Serrano, Roberto - 1998
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010420254
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A Decentralized Market with Common Values Uncertainty: Non-Steady States
Blouin, Max; Serrano, Roberto - Brown University, Department of Economics - 1998
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094145
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Implementing the Mas-Colell bargaining set
Serrano, Roberto; Vohra, Rajiv - 2001
We provide a mechanism that approximately implements the Mas-Colell bargaining set in subgame perfect equilibrium. The … mechanism is based on the definition of the Mas-Colell bargaining set, and respects feasibility in and out of equilibrium. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318986
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The nucleolus, the kernel, and the bargaining set: an update
Iñarra García, Elena; Serrano, Roberto; Shimomura, … - 2019
nucleolus. This paper is an update on the nucleolus and its two related supersolutions, i.e., the kernel and the bargaining set. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012018578
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Fifty years of the Nash program, 1953 - 2003
Serrano, Roberto - 2004
This paper is a survey of the work in the Nash program for coalitional games, a research agenda proposed by Nash (1953) to bridge the gap between the non-cooperative and cooperative approaches to game theory.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318959
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Market power and information revelation in dynamic trading
Gottardi, Piero; Serrano, Roberto - 2002
one seller, full information revelation never occurs in equilibrium and the only information transmission happens in the … first period. The outcome with n sellers depends both on the structure of sellers' information and, more importantly, on the … intensity of competition among them allowed by the trading rules. With intense competition (absence of clienteles), information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318890
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Small informational size and interim cores of large quasilinear economies
Kamishiro, Yusuke; Serrano, Roberto - 2018
We provide nonemptiness results of approximate interim cores with endogenous communication in large quasilinear economies, where every agent's informational size is small. We offer results for both replica and more general sequences of economies.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011890497
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Level-k mechanism design
De Clippel, Geoffroy; Saran, Rene; Serrano, Roberto - 2016 - This version: July 2016
Models of choice where agents see others as less sophisticated than themselves have significantly different, sometimes more accurate, predictions in games than does Nash equilibrium. When it comes to mechanism design, however, they turn out to have surprisingly similar implications. This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011515723