equivalent (implying that so are the theory of implementation and the Nash program). This facilitates the understanding of the … ``real implementation'' is examined. …

We view achieving a particular correlated equilibrium distribution for a normal form game as an implementation problem …

rationalizable implementation. Set-monotonicity is much weaker than Maskin monotonicity, which is the key condition for Nash … implementation and which also had been shown to be necessary for rationalizable implementation of social choice functions. Set …-monotonicity reduces to Maskin monotonicity in the case of functions. We conclude that the conditions for rationalizable implementation are …

We study the classic implementation problem under the behavioral assumption that agents myopically adjust their actions … information. First, we show that a necessary condition for assymptotically stable implementation is a small variation of (Maskin … Nash implementation which has good dynamic properties if the rule is quasimonotonic. Thus, quasimonotonicity is both …

We view achieving a particular correlated equilibrium distribution for a normal form game as an implementation problem …

implementation. This is done through a reinterpretation of the characteristic function that avoids feasibility problems, thereby … cooperative solution that is Maskin monotonic. Thus, implementation of most cooperative solutions must rely on refinements of the …

equivalent (implying that so are the theory of implementation and the Nash program). This clarifies some misunderstandings (in …