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The nucleolus, the kernel, and the bargaining set: an update
Iñarra García, Elena; Serrano, Roberto; Shimomura, … - 2019
One of the many important contributions in David Schmeidler's distinguished career was the introduction of the nucleolus. This paper is an update on the nucleolus and its two related supersolutions, i.e., the kernel and the bargaining set.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012018578
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Information transmission and core convergence in quasilinear economies
Kamishiro, Yusuke (contributor);  … - 2008
We study core convergence in interim quasilinear economies with asymmetric information, concentrating on core notions …. Specifically, we shall focus on the credible core and randomized mediated core concepts. We consider independent replicas of the … individuals who belong to the same copy. We provide an example in which core convergence does not obtain for the Dutta …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003728413
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Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games
Vohra, Rajiv; Serrano, Roberto - 2009
A core allocation of a complete information economy can be characterized as one that would not be unanimously rejected … of such voting games, this approach makes it possible to derive core concepts in which the transmission of information … among members of a coalition is endogenous. Our results lend support to the credible core of Dutta and Vohra (2003) and the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014064860
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Information Transmission and Core Convergence in Quasilinear Economies
Kamishiro, Yusuke; Serrano, Roberto - 2008
We study core convergence in interim quasilinear economies with asymmetric information, concentrating on core notions …. Specifically, we shall focus on the credible core and randomized mediated core concepts. We consider independent replicas of the … individuals who belong to the same copy. We provide an example in which core convergence does not obtain for the Dutta …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014047845
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A comparison of the average prekernel and the prekernel
Serrano, Roberto; Shimomura, Ken-ichi - 2001
We propose positive and normative foundations for the average prekernel of NTU games, and compare them with the existing ones for the prekernel. In our non-cooperative analysis, the average prekernel is understood as the equilibrium payoffs of a game where each player faces the possibility of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318958
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Information transmission in coalitional voting games
Serrano, Roberto; Vohra, Rajiv - 2005
A core allocation of a complete information economy can be characterized as one that would not be unanimously rejected … of such voting games, this approach makes it possible to derive core concepts in which the transmission of information … among members of a coalition is endogenous. Our results lend support to the credible core of Dutta and Vohra (2003) and the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318981
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A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation
Serrano, Roberto - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 1996
allowing an analysis that focuses exclusively on the payoff space. In this framework, we show that the core is the only major …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772396
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Level-k mechanism design
De Clippel, Geoffroy; Saran, Rene; Serrano, Roberto - 2016 - This version: July 2016
Models of choice where agents see others as less sophisticated than themselves have significantly different, sometimes more accurate, predictions in games than does Nash equilibrium. When it comes to mechanism design, however, they turn out to have surprisingly similar implications. This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011515723
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Mechanism design with bounded depth of reasoning and small modeling mistakes
De Clippel, Geoffroy; Saran, Rene; Serrano, Roberto - 2014
We consider mechanism design in contexts in which agents exhibit bounded depth of reasoning (level k ) instead of rational expectations. We use simple direct mechanisms, in which agents report only first-order beliefs. While level 0 agents are assumed to be truth tellers, level k agents...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010401721
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Cooperative games with incomplete information : some open problems
Forges, Françoise; Serrano, Roberto - 2011
This is a brief survey describing some of the recent progress and open problems in the area of cooperative games with incomplete information. We discuss exchange economies, cooperative Bayesian games with orthogonal coalitions, and issues of cooperation in non-cooperative Bayesian games. --...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009272152