We address the question whether and on what conditions will an access-seeker be provided with access to a necessary input. We study this question in a model in which multiple vertically-integrated firms - potential access providers - compete. Although it might seem in such a setting that...

In his recent paper entitled “How Loyalty Discounts Can Perversely Discourage Discounting,” Professor Einer Elhauge argues that exclusive contracts with loyalty discounts offered by a single incumbent seller can create anticompetitive effects in a broad range of settings. In this comment we...

We consider a two-period model with two sellers and one buyer in which the efficient outcome calls for the buyer to purchase one unit from each seller in each period. We show that when the buyer's valuations between periods are linked by switching costs and at least one seller is financially...

All-units discounts in retail contracts refer to discounts that lower a retailer's wholesale price on every unit purchased when the retailer's purchases equal or exceed some quantity threshold. These discounts pose a challenge to economic theory because it is difficult to understand why a...

We consider a two-period model with two sellers and one buyer. Although we assume it is efficient for the buyer to purchase from both sellers in each period, we show that when the buyer's valuations are inter-temporally linked and at least one seller is financially constrained, exclusion can...

All-units discounts in retail contracts refer to discounts that lower a retailer's wholesale price on every unit purchased when the retailer's purchases equal or exceed some quantity threshold. These discounts pose a challenge to economic theory because it is difficult to understand why a...